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ABSTRACT
This Article is the first cross-disciplinary, comprehensive assessment of
one of the earliest regulatory reinvention programs developed to foster more
participation and adaptation in decision-making—the Endangered Species
Act’s Habitat Conservation Plan Program. Drawing not only from legal
sources but also integrating data from recent scientific studies, interviews,
surveys of government officials, newspaper investigations, and unpublished
databases, this Article delves into the pioneering but defective HCP
program as an example of regulatory innovation gone awry.
In the active literature on regulatory reinvention, many have pointed to
the HCP program as a prototype for collaborative, experimentalist
innovations in governance. Though a few HCPs processes are promising
examples of the value of broad participation and adaptation in regulation,
this Article asserts that the HCP program, as implemented, largely allows
for the proliferation of bilateral and inert agreements between agencies and
developers for evading the ESA’s otherwise strict prohibitions. More
fundamentally, the Article suggests that the HCP regulatory experiment is
failing because the agencies charged with administering it have never
seriously treated it like an experiment. As Congress again contemplates
substantial ESA amendments, the Article argues that regulatory programs
must themselves be periodically and systematically adapted in order for
agencies, Congress and the public at large to learn and adapt from
regulatory mistakes and successes. Only by viewing a regulatory program
as an experiment, and by addressing the incentives of the agencies and
applicants to cultivate participation and regulatory adaptation, can the HCP
program—and indeed all regulation—evolve.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1982, Congress established what leading scholars have called a grand
“experiment”1 and “paradigm shift”2 in regulatory design—the Endangered
Species Act’s (“ESA”) Habitat Conservation Plan (“HCP”) program.
Departing from the ESA’s initially strict and broad prohibition on harming
any listed species, the 1982 ESA amendments authorized the issuance of
incidental take permits (ITPs) that allowed protected species and/or their
habitat to be harmed if carried out in conjunction with an approved HCP.
HCPs were to rely on negotiated, collaborative decision-making and focus
on developing creative, flexible ways for managing uncertain, evolving
ecosystems based on the best available science. The HCP program was thus
the earliest of a number of experimental innovations touted by many leading
scholars as transforming administrative law from its traditionally static and
inflexible “command-and-control” regulatory model into a negotiated
process that balances public goals through both collaborative and adaptive
decision-making.3

1

E.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
664 (2000) (referring to HCP program as an “experiment”); A. Dan Tarlock, Fred
Bosselman as Participant-Observer Lawyer: The Case of Habitat Conservation Planning,
17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 43, 50 (2001) (“HCP experiments represent a potentially
important turning point in environmental law.”); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive
Management-Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 21, 39-40 (2005) (explaining the
“HCP adaptive management experiment”); See also J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart
and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91
GEO. L.J. 757, 847 n.289 (2003) (“The [HCP] program is often included as an example of
an innovative performance-based regulatory reinvention.”).
2
Lindell Marsh, Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: A New
Paradigm for Conserving Biological Diversity, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 98 (1994). See also
Robert Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability Habitat Conservation
Planning under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605, 607 (1991); David
A. Dana, The New Contractarian Paradigm in Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 35, 38-40 (describing HCP program as the earliest occurrence of the “new
contractarian paradigm” in administrative regulation).
3
See, e.g., Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1
(1982); Daniel Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278 (1993); Jody
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1997); Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); ARCHON FUNG & ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, DEEPENING
DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE
(2003); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Alejandro Camacho,
Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community
Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions: Installment Two, 24 STAN.
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Notwithstanding the scholarly support for these new experimental
programs, few in-depth analyses of them exist in the literature. As the first
comprehensive, cross-disciplinary assessment of the ESA’s HCP program,
this Article demonstrates the resistance to experimentation by both the
regulators and the regulated in collaborative administrative programs, and
the need to attend to the incentives of these actors for regulatory adaptation
to succeed. In light of the recent and increasingly insistent appeals by
scientists for workable solutions to address the alarming and worsening
biodiversity crisis4—and as the U.S. Congress once again contemplates
substantially modifying the ESA5—a comprehensive assessment of the
HCP program is particularly valuable. As one of the first experimental
approaches to governance seeking to reinvent public regulatory law, the
HCP program serves as an ideal case study both for analyzing the value
such characteristics bring to regulatory decisions and the suitability of
existing regulatory institutions in developing them. Drawing not only from
conventional legal primary and secondary sources but also integrating
recent biological and social scientific studies, newspaper investigations,
interviews, surveys of government officials, and unpublished scientific
databases on HCPs, this Article attempts these functions.
When initially added to the ESA in 1982, the HCP program was seen by
many as a fundamental shift in administrative regulation that incorporated
two primary elements.6 The first “collaborative” element suggested that
ENVTL. L.J. 269 (2005); Jody Freeman & Daniel Farber, Modular Environmental
Regulation 54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005).
4
See Michel Loreau et al., Diversity Without Representation, 442 NATURE 245 (2006)
(recent statement from nineteen preeminent biologists asserting: “There is … clear
scientific evidence that we are on the verge of a major biodiversity crisis. … Despite this
evidence, biodiversity is still consistently undervalued and given inadequate weight in both
private and public decisions. There is an urgent need to bridge the gap between science and
policy.”); E.O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 254 (1992) (stating biodiversity loss is the
“scientific problem of great[est] immediate importance to humanity.”).
5
The U.S. House of Representatives passed a significant amendment to the ESA on
September 29, 2005, proposing to replace critical habitat requirements with less restrictive
“recovery habitat” requirements, provide incentive programs and guarantees to landowners,
and pay landowners for the market value of development they could no longer undertake if
found to be endangered species habitat. See Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery
Act of 2005 (TESRA), H.R. 3824, 109th Cong. (2005). A potential Senate bill focusing on
similar issues has been referred to the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee,
though the Senate is unlikely to consider any such bill until 2007. See Collaboration and
Recovery of Endangered Species Act (CRESA), S. 2110, 109th Cong. (2005). See also
Allison Freeman, Sen. Inhofe ready to take over ESA rewrite, ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT
DAILY, April 4, 2006; Allison Freeman & Dan Berman, Senate ESA rewrite unlikely this
year, Chafee says, ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT DAILY, March 29, 2006.
6
See infra Part I.
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engaging the affected stakeholders in meaningful involvement is likely to
lead to better regulatory decisions—and ultimately more effective
environmental protection—than traditional regulation that relies almost
exclusively on agency resources. The second “adaptive” element
emphasized a reliance on “contingency planning”7 or “adaptive
management”8 protocols—repeated review and, if necessary, adjustment of
regulatory restrictions to account for new information or changed
circumstances that arise during implementation. Many, including private
land developers, government officials, academics, and environmentalists
have hailed the program as innovative and a more effective approach to
administrative regulation than the traditional, command-and-control model.
The past two decades have seen the HCP program become “the
centerpiece of … endangered species and ecosystem conservation policy,”9
as HCPs have proliferated throughout the United States. Though some
HCPs processes have voluntarily replicated these collaborative efforts, this
Article argues that key interpretations and management decisions by the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) (collectively, the Services)10 by and large allow
for decision-making processes to provide few meaningful participation
opportunities.11 As a result, existing empirical evidence demonstrates that
most HCP processes relegated interested stakeholders to a narrow and late
role in the decision-making process while the Services and developerapplicant negotiate the vast majority of the plan.12 This often produces
risky regulatory approvals that lack key information despite the ESA’s
stated requirement of basing permit decisions on the “best scientific and
commercial data available.”13 Although the growing empirical evidence
demonstrates that providing early and periodic opportunities for
participation in HCP processes is valuable, information gathering regularly
ignores opportunities for alternative information from non-developer
stakeholders and rarely encourages independent scientific review.
7

See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(5), 17.32(b)(5) (2004)
See Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation
Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,252 (June 1, 2000)
(hereinafter “HCP Handbook Addendum”).
9
Bradley Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty
Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 970 (2003)
10
The ESA is primarily administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the FWS
for land and freshwater species, and the Secretary of Commerce through the NMFS for
marine species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (2000) (defining “Secretary”); Id. § 1533(a)(2);
50 C.F.R. § 424.01 (2005) (FWS/NMFS joint regulations).
11
See infra Part II.A.
12
See infra Part II.B.
13
16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2) (2000).
8
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Perhaps more discouraging is the limited use of contingency planning
and adaptive management by the Services, despite how critical such
activities are to the participatory democratic and conservation goals of the
HCP program. Because of key interpretations by the Services, and the
incentives created for applicants and Service staff by these interpretations,
this adaptive management approach fundamental to the HCP program has
largely been disregarded.14 Monitoring of plan compliance is usually
deficient, if not entirely absent, and subsequent adaptation of HCPs to
integrate new information acquired during implementation is even rarer.
Though the Services have repeatedly suggested adaptive management and
contingency planning would be valuable characteristics of HCPs, their
actions suggest an aversion to implementing these characteristics.
Yet, as problematic as these defects may be, this Article more
fundamentally argues that the HCP program has failed to embrace
experimentalism and adaptive management with regard to the regulatory
process itself. 15 By being demonstrably un-adaptive, the Services have
failed to take full advantage of the valuable knowledge readily available
from preceding HCP processes. Not only are the Services insufficiently
adapting individual HCPs; they have failed to gather systematic information
about the HCP program, learn from its successes, or adjust to its failures. In
doing so, the HCP program has merely repeated the mistakes of its
regulatory brethren in failing to harness the potential for regulatory learning
that exists for every regulatory program. By adjusting the Services and
applicants incentives toward greater attention to monitoring, collection and
dissemination of information about HCP processes, Congress, the Services,
and the public can finally gain the tools to assess regulatory outcomes.16
Only then can the HCP program—long seen as a pioneering approach in the
ever-increasing wave of alternatives to command and control regulation in
environmental governance—serve as a model for other regulatory programs
on the potential for regulatory learning.
The Article consists of five parts. For purposes of the case study, Part I
provides a detailed account of the development of the ESA’s HCP program
as one of the earliest experiments in regulatory innovation. It also explores
the promise of adaptively managing regulatory processes both for
environmental conservation and administrative regulation generally. Parts
II through V assess how well the HCP program has lived up to the promise
of adaptive regulation. Part II analyzes the Services interpretation and
14

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.A
16
See infra Part IV.B.
15
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management of the participation requirements of the HCP program. This
Part marshals evidence signifying the considerable value of participation in
fostering better quality decisions and decision-making processes, as well as
the Services’ and applicants systematic aversion to it. Part III then
examines the significant Service interpretations of the monitoring and
adaptation elements of the HCP program, exploring the incentives and
disincentives that the Services have created for applicants and Service staff
to provide opportunities for monitoring and adaptation. This Part then
analyzes the impeding effect of these interpretations on monitoring and
adaptation in the implementation of HCPs.
In Part IV, the Article explores the maladaptive management of the
HCP program as a whole, arguing that the Services ignore the need for
programmatic, systematic collection and analysis of HCP formation,
information gathering, and implementation processes for learning about the
HCP program itself. Finally, Part V draws on the lessons of the HCP
program experiment to explore the ways the HCP program should be altered
to serve as a more participatory, experimental, adaptive, and ultimately
more cost effective, approach to environmental regulation. The Article
concludes by considering how lessons learned from the HCP program about
adaptive regulatory management can help us to develop protocols of
adaptively managing other regulatory processes generally.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN PROGRAM
A. The Endangered Species Act and Habitat Conservation Plan
Amendments
The federal Endangered Species Act has evolved dramatically since its
adoption in 1973 as a strict and broad prohibition on the “take” of any
endangered species.17 Congress enacted the ESA to actualize the public
goal of “better safeguarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the Nation’s
heritage in fish, wildlife, and plants,”18 recognizing many vulnerable
species are of “esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and
scientific value.”19 From the outset, the ESA declared as a primary purpose
not only the conservation of endangered and threatened species but also the
protection of the ecosystems upon which such species depend.20 To fulfill
17

16 U.S.C. §1532 (2000).
Id. § 1531(b).
19
Id. § 1531(a).
20
See id. § 1531(b); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 699-700 (1995) (acknowledging that the ESA serves to
18
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these goals, the ESA incorporated restrictions applied to species listed as
threatened or endangered based on a careful assessment of the risk of
extinction relying on “the best scientific and commercial data available.”21
Established as a strict prohibition statute, the ESA expressly forbids
harmful actions against listed endangered and threatened species.22 In
addition to the Section 7 prohibition of any federal action23 that would
“jeopardize the continued existence”24 of any listed species or result in the
modification of their “critical habitat,”25 the ESA through Section 9 strictly
prohibited the “take” of any endangered species by any person, public or
private.26 The statute extends the stringent ban on taking quite broadly to
include to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect or attempt to engage in any such conduct,”27 and subsequent judicial
opinions have upheld expansive regulatory interpretations of this language
to include habitat modification.28

protect vulnerable ecosystems, with listed species functioning as an indicator that the
underlying ecosystem is faltering).
21
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1) (2000). Species may be listed only after public participation
and solicitation of independent scientific peer review. See id. § 1533 (b)(1)(A);
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy
for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act Violations, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,720 (July 1, 1994).
22
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2004); 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2000).
23
Action includes any activity “authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part,
by federal agencies.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005).
24
16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2000 & Supp. III 2004). See also T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978) (finding jeopardy determination must be made strictly without regard to costs and
benefits of the proposed agency action).
25
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. III 2004). If a species is listed, the Services
must designate critical habitat (CH) in areas where the species is currently found or which
might provide additional habitat for the species’ recovery. See id. However, FWS has only
designated CH for thirty-six percent of listed domestic species as of June 2006. See Eugene
H. Buck et al., The Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the 109th Congress: Conflicting
Values and Difficult Choices, RL33468 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT 3
(2006).
26
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000). For threatened species, the take prohibition is not
automatic; FWS may apply the ban at its discretion (see id. § 1533(d)), which it has done in
most cases. See TIMOTHY BEATLEY, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING: ENDANGERED
SPECIES AND URBAN GROWTH 17 (1994).
27
16 U.S.C. §1532(19) (2000).
28
See Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources, 639 F. 2d 495, 497 (9th
Cir. 1981); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon, 515
U.S. 687 (1995) (determining Service interpretation of statutory definition of “harm” to
include “significant habitat modification or degradation” that significantly impairs
breeding, feeding or sheltering patterns was reasonable).
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In the first decade after the statute’s enactment, Section 9’s strict and
broad prohibition on the take of listed species caused concern not only
among private landowners and developers, but also government officials
and environmentalists. Unsurprisingly, landowners were alarmed by the
financial implications and criminal liability of the broad take prohibition’s
land use restrictions.29 Yet some officials and environmentalists also found
Section 9 ineffective as a tool for species conservation on private lands.30
Evidence indicated that species continued to decline and habitat continued
to be destroyed after listing, in large part because of poor enforcement due
to the Services’ limited resources31 and the difficulty of monitoring and
enforcement on private lands.32 In addition, because of the strict effect of
Section 9, listing decisions became very adversarial and politicized,33 and
the Services were reluctant to enforce a take prohibition that raised such
political rancor.34 Finally, environmentalists criticized Section 9’s focus on
prohibiting harm to isolated species and guarding fragmented habitat rather
than fostering the ESA’s goal of a more comprehensive, ecosystem-based
approach to conservation and recovery.35
In part as a result of these criticisms, in 1982 the ESA was amended to
allow the Services to issue “incidental take” permits (ITPs), allowing
permittees to harm or even destroy members of a protected species. Under
Section 10(a), the Services may issue a permit to private and non-federal
public actors authorizing the incidental take of a listed species in
conjunction with an approved habitat conservation plan (HCP).36 In
29

See LAURA HOOD, FRAYED SAFETY NETS: CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1-2 (1998).
30
Michael Bean and D.S. Wilcove, The Private Land Problem, 11 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 1-2 (2001).
31
See HOOD, supra note 29, at 1.
32
See George F. Wilhere, Adaptive Management In Habitat Conservation Plans, 16
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20, 23 (2001) (stating landowners often interfered with
monitoring and refrained from reporting when species were on property). HOOD, supra
note 29, at 1-2 (reporting that due to limited Service oversight, landowners sometimes
destroyed potential habitat before it was discovered).
33
Craig Thomas, Habitat Conservation Planning: Certainly Empowered, Somewhat
Deliberative, Questionably Democratic, 29 POLITICS & SOCIETY 105, 107 (2001).
34
See Buck et al., supra note 25, at 19; Wilhere, supra note 32, at 22.
35
See HOOD, supra note 29, at 3; Thomas, supra note 33, at 107.
36
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000). Federal agencies and federal permittees can also
circumvent the Section 9 prohibitions if the Service issues an incidental take statement
(ITS) through the Section 7 interagency consultation process. See id. §§ 1539(a)(1)(B),
1536(b)(4). Though this Article focuses on the HCP program, many of the same criticisms
are also likely to be valid for the Section 7 ITS program (which accounts for at least as
many incidental take activities as HCPs). An ITS flows from the Services to an applicant
through the permitting agency, and is in many respects the functional equivalent of a
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seeking an ITP, a developer-applicant must submit a proposed HCP that
specifies: (1) the planned action’s projected impact; (2) steps to be taken to
monitor, lessen, and mitigate the taking’s impact; (3) funding for such
mitigation; (4) alternatives to the taking the applicant considered and “the
reasons why such alternatives are not being utilized;” and (5) any other
measures the Service requires.37 To grant an ITP, the Services must, after
affording opportunity for public comment,38 find that: (1) the proposed
taking is “incidental;”39 (2) the HCP minimizes and mitigates the taking’s
impacts “to the maximum extent practicable;” (3) the applicant has ensured
“adequate” funding for the HCP; (4) the taking will not “appreciably”
reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of the species; and (5) the
HCP meets any other “necessary or appropriate” measures.40 Section
10(a)’s moderation of the ESA’s strict prohibition thus allowed for the first
time the systematic consideration of questions of economic feasibility in
species conservation disputes.41 As evident from such open terms as
“practicable,” “adequate,” “appreciably,” and “appropriate”—and
reinforced by the Service’s interpretive guidelines42—the requisite findings
provide considerable flexibility to whoever is allowed access to participate
in the formation of the plan.

section 10 authorization. Like ITPs, an ITS is not available for public examination or
comment until it has been finalized. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT SECTION 7 CONSULTATION HANDBOOK 1-12 (1998).
37
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (2000).
38
See id. § 1539(c); 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(c) (2005) (FWS implementing regulations); Id.
§ 222.24(a) (NMFS implementing regulations).
39
An “incidental take” is broadly defined as any taking “that result[s] from, but [is] not
the purpose of, carrying out an otherwise lawful activity conducted by the Federal agency
or applicant.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005).
40
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (2000). See also Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 185
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding Service, and not just developer, must determine that alternatives
considered were impracticable).
41
Section 7’s 1978 Endangered Species Committee amendments do allow federal
actions a cabinet-level extraordinary exemption from the prohibition against jeopardizing a
listed species when the action’s benefits “clearly outweigh” the benefits of conservation
alternatives. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (2000). However, only one exemption has ever been
executed pursuant to this section. See Buck et al., supra note 25, at 19, 23-24.
42
The Services’ jointly promulgated “HCP Handbook” provides that any mitigation
mandated in an HCP must be “commensurate with the impacts,” and based on a “sound
biological rationale.” U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE & NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES
SERVICE, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK 3-19, 7-3 (1996) (hereinafter
“HCP HANDBOOK”). The HCP Handbook also provides two variables in determining the
sufficiency of proposed mitigation: (1) the extent to which the measures provide substantial
benefits to species; and (2) whether mitigation is the maximum practicable in light of the
“costs and benefits of additional mitigation,” the applicant’s abilities, and mitigation
provided by other applicants in similar circumstances. Id. at 3-19, 7-3.

DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE, QUOTE OR REPRODUCE

14-Aug-06]

MAKING REGULATION EVOLVE

9

B. An Experiment in Collaborative and Adaptive Regulation
The introduction of the HCP process to the ESA was not only touted as
a method for taking into account economic considerations, but more widely
as an innovative, collaborative shift in environmental dispute resolution.
Though there were many appeals to soften Section 9’s strict prohibition, the
prototype for the amendments actually adopted came directly from a
successful collaborative planning effort in San Bruno, California that
assembled a wide range of interested parties in a steering committee to
resolve a complex development and species conservation dispute.43
The flaws of Section 9’s restrictive approach were starkly evident on
San Bruno Mountain. Because the underlying ecosystem and even the
listed species were vulnerable to non-development threats such as nonnative
species, merely prohibiting development from harming the listed species
and habitat would not only frustrate economic interests but long-term
conservation concerns as well.44 As a result, federal, state and local
officials, landowners, developers, and conservation organizations engaged
in a multilateral, rigorous data-gathering and negotiation process seeking an
alternative that culminated in a 30-year conservation agreement. The
accord allowed limited development that would take critical habitat but
provide a long-term program funded by the development to protect and
enhance the remaining plan area as habitat.45 The plan relied on (1) shared
information gathering on the impact and alternatives of the proposed take
based on the best available science, (2) meaningful multiparty deliberation
on the mitigation plan for the species, and (3) continued monitoring and
adjustment during implementation to manage and restore the evolving
ecosystem for the life of the plan.46
The San Bruno HCP’s integration of these characteristics into the
decision-making process was a central motivating factor for the 1982 ESA
amendments.47 In adopting the amendment, Congress stated that the San
43

See Thornton, supra note 2, at 622; BEATLEY, supra note 26, at 17.
See HOOD, supra note 29, at 30; Zygmunt Plater, The Embattled Social Utilities of
the Endangered Species Act - A Noah Presumption and Caution Against Putting Gasmasks
on the Canaries in the Coalmine, 27 ENVIRON. LAW 845, 874 n.111 (1997).
45
See Lindell Marsh & Robert Thornton, The San Bruno Mountain Habitat
Conservation Plan, in MANAGING LAND-USE CONFLICTS 114, 119-125 (1987).
46
See Michael Bean et al., RECONCILING CONFLICTS UNDER THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT 52 (1991).
47
See BEATLEY, supra note 26, at 17, 19; Graham Lyons, Habitat Conservation Plans:
Restoring the Promise of Conservation, 23-Fall ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 83, 102
(1999).
44
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Bruno HCP was the model for the Section 10(a) incidental take permit and
that the “adequacy of similar conservation plans should be measured against
the San Bruno plan.”48 Congress emphasized the public involvement and
support for the San Bruno process,49 the reliance on “independent
exhaustive biological study,” a more comprehensive, ecosystem-based
approach,50 and effective, adaptable implementation.51 Service officials
underscore that the HCP program was created out of a desire to transform
the ESA from a static and narrow emergency statute into a multilateral,
collaborative tool for addressing complex, long-term environmental
disputes.52 Similarly, practitioners involved in species conservation
disputes saw the HCP program as a necessary alternative to the ESA’s
conventional but inflexible, expensive, and ultimately ineffective approach
to resolving resource conflicts:
[I]t was becoming increasingly apparent that the wildlife conservation
objective would be difficult, if not impossible, to attain by utilizing our
historic project-by-project, adversarial, quasi judicial processes. … The
interest in the HCP approach reflects the conclusion that the result of this
historic model has been fragmented and ineffective mitigation, very expensive
and often unsuccessful attempts to save “endangered” species, an
unacceptable level of frustration and conflict, and the belief that we must do
better, without compromising the two principles of biodiversity conservation
and freedom.53

In its promotion of meaningful participation and long-term ecosystembased solutions, the HCP program’s multilateral, agreement-based approach
to regulation was one of the earliest in a wave of experimental approaches

48

H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. 31 (1982). See also id. (stating the HCP
process could “reduce conflicts between listed species and economic development
activities,” “integrate non-Federal development and land use activities with conservation
goals,” “provide a framework that would encourage ‘creative partnerships’ between the
public and private sectors” and “create a climate of partnership and cooperation.”);
Thornton, supra note 2, at 624; HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 1-2.
49
See Lyons, supra note 47, at 102 (“Congress was sure to point out the fact that local
citizens and environmental organizations supported the San Bruno plan.”).
50
H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 32 (1982).
51
See id. at 31, 32 (1982).
52
See George Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the Clinton Administration, 7
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 39, 40 (1996) (key Interior Department official stating HCP
reforms represent an effort to transform the ESA from “a species-by-species ‘emergency
room’ regulatory tool or safety net into a comprehensive vehicle for regional multi-species
habitat planning in collaboration with state and local governments, private landowners and
other interest groups.”); Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation Plans: Frayed Safety
Nets or Creative Partnerships?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 94 (2001).
53
Marsh, supra note 2, at 110.
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to governance that have since percolated in public regulatory law.54 Such
innovations seek to reinvent regulation to address widespread concerns
regarding the ineffectiveness and adversarialism of existing decision
making processes55 by incorporating more meaningful participation
opportunities and flexibility in a wide range of regulatory processes.56
Established programs in this vision have been relatively few in number at
the federal level,57 but they have nonetheless arisen in a variety of local and
less formal regulatory contexts.58 In addition, some existing conventional
regulatory programs are being modified to be more adaptive to changing
circumstances and new information.59
In this context, a number of models have been proposed in the legal and
social science academies emphasizing the value of participation and
adaptation in making public governance more effective and fair. These
models, and the experimental programs upon which they are based, rely
heavily on promoting participation by the affected parties and the
development of regulatory institutions that allow for flexibility and learning
in and through the regulatory process.60 Numerous new conceptions of
regulation identified as “empowered participatory governance,”61

54

See Camacho, supra note 3, at 273-75.
See Freeman, supra note 3, at 3, 35 (1997); Harter, supra note 3, at 6-7 (1982).
56
See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., USING ASSISTED NEGOTIATION TO SETTLE LAND
USE DISPUTES: A GUIDEBOOK FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS 19-23 (1999); Judith E. Innes,
Planning Through Consensus Building, 62 AM. PLAN. ASS’N. J. 460, 464-65 (1996); Cases
and Commentaries, THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
REACHING AGREEMENT 679-1010 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999).
57
In addition to the ESA’s HCP program, the most prominent examples of federal
negotiated administrative processes include regulatory negotiation under the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act (Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (2000)) and the
negotiation of Final Project Agreements under the Environmental Protection Agency’s
Project XL. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23,
1995).
58
See FUNG & WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 6-14; SUSSKIND ET AL., supra note 56, at 1923; Lobel, supra note 3, at 404-07.
59
See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act Revised Implementing Procedures, 69
Fed. Reg. 10,866 (Mar. 8, 2004) (amending NEPA implementation regulations to make
adaptive management an explicit goal of NEPA environmental impact review).
60
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 3, at 22, 28-29 (emphasizing harnessing and
enhancing the capabilities of private and democratic institutions through processes that
encourage broad participation, a problem solving orientation, adaptable regulatory
solutions, accountability through interdependence and mutual monitoring, and a flexible,
engaged agency.
61
FUNG & WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 15; ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION:
REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY (2004). See also CHARLES SABEL ET AL., BEYOND
BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM (2000).
55
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“collaborative governance,”62 “democratic experimentalism,”63 and
“directly deliberative polyarchy”64 stress the value of multilateral
deliberation in fostering more informed and widely supported regulatory
decisions. In addition to its communitarian value,65 many claim an open
participatory process can thwart the potential for capture and corruption
associated with conventional bilateral approaches to regulation, provide
valuable information for shaping regulatory decisions that are more
satisfactory to those affected and the public generally,66 and enhance
accountability for governmental services and decisions.67 Drawing on a
pragmatic notion of decision-making as an ongoing, iterative process of
design, implementation and evaluation,68 these and other scholars69 also
promote the development of regulatory institutions that allow for flexibility
and learning within the regulatory process.70 Regulation is reconceived of
as a continuing process of monitoring and adaptation that must be flexible
to maximize effectiveness.71 Though the commitments to participation and
62

See generally Freeman, supra note 3; Camacho, supra note 3.
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3, at 286-87.
64
Id. at 288 (defined as “citizens in each locale participate directly in determining and
assessing the utility of the services local government provides, given the possibility of
comparing the performance of their jurisdiction to the performance of similar settings.”);
Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L. J. 313-340
(1997).
65
See Freeman, supra note 3, at 27.
66
See Thomas Beierle & Jerry Cayford, Dispute Resolution as a Method of Public
Participation, in THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 53, 63-66 (Rosemary O’Leary & Lisa B. Bingham eds., 2003) (discussing the
instrumental, substantive and normative values of public participation); Dorf & Sabel,
supra note 3, at 317 (discussing fundamental value of direct and continuous participation).
67
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3, at 288 (stating local participation in service
provision evaluation can serve to increase the accountability of regulatory institutions).
68
See id. at 285 (stating pragmatism accepts “the impossibility of defining first
principles that survive the effort to realize them, as a constitutive feature of thought and
action, and not as an unfortunate incident of modern political life”).
69
Proponents of “eco-pragmatism” and “jurisdynamics” also emphasize an
understanding of the law as a fundamentally iterative process. For a comprehensive
justification of eco-pragmatism, see DANIEL FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING
SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999); Daniel Farber,
Building Bridges over Troubled Waters: Eco-pragmatism and the Environmental Prospect,
87 MINN. L. REV. 851 (2003). For a complete account of jurisdynamics, see THE
JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Jim Chen ed., 2003); Jim Chen, The Pragmatic Ecologist:
Environmental Protection as a Jurisdynamic Experience, 87 MINN. L. REV. 847 (2003).
70
See Freeman, supra note 3, at 28-29; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3, at 285.
71
See Freeman, supra note 3, at 28 (“[A] flexible, adaptive system capable of
responding to advances in science, technology, knowledge, and shifting human judgments
will produce better rules that are more likely to accomplish legislative goals.”).
63

DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE, QUOTE OR REPRODUCE

14-Aug-06]

MAKING REGULATION EVOLVE

13

adaptation do not necessarily require a commitment to the other, many
suggest that they are synergistic.72
These negotiated regulatory processes are promoted as new privatepublic relationships that harness the capacities of affected private parties to
assist in governance.73 Rejecting the perception of regulation as an
authoritarian exercise of power through static, detailed, uniform rules,74
proponents suggest that regulation should more appropriately be understood
as a set of negotiated relationships analogous to bilateral or multilateral
contract.75 Negotiated regulatory decision-making is seen as enhancing
both governmental and private power by ensuring private involvement in
public decision-making, while allowing agencies to influence projects in
more effective ways.76
Despite the growing theoretical literature in support of this professed
paradigm shift, fundamental questions still persist about the promise of this
burgeoning new generation of administrative regulation.
Can
administrative institutions adapt to new modalities of regulation that require
transparency, dexterity in the adoption and implementation of regulatory
decisions, and a re-conception of the agency’s role as one of
facilitator/mediator? What factors are essential for fostering an adaptive
approach to regulation? In what regulatory contexts is a collaborative,
adaptive approach more likely to flourish? As one of the earliest versions
of multilateral, collaborative and adaptive regulation, the HCP program is
an ideal case study of the challenges of this new paradigm, providing
valuable early lessons on the capacities of existing administrative
institutions to engage in adaptive regulatory management in other contexts.
Unfortunately, as detailed in Parts II through IV, infra, the experience of the
HCP program is that much must evolve in existing institutions for adaptive
regulation to have any chance of success.
II. AN AVERSION TOWARD PARTICIPATION
As implemented by the Services, the 1982 HCP regulatory experiment
has undoubtedly transformed the ESA. Though at first only a dozen HCPs
were approved in the decade following institution of the HCP program, they
exploded in use during the Clinton and Bush (II) administrations, with three
72

See J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV.
885, 936 (2003).
73
See Freeman, supra note 3, at 4; Harter, supra note 3, at 103.
74
See Freeman, supra note 3, at 28-29.
75
See Freeman, supra note 1, at 548-49.
76
See id. at 671.
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hundred HCPs adopted by the end of 200077 and over 460 HCPs approved
to date.78 Furthermore, as detailed in this Part, there is encouraging
evidence that the more collaborative, multilateral prototype on which the
1982 HCP amendments relied has considerable promise in cultivating better
informed, and ultimately higher quality, regulatory decisions.
Unfortunately, as a result of limited Service interpretations of Section 10(a)
and inhibited program management, existing empirical evidence reveals that
the HCP program predominantly has served merely to allow bilateral, illinformed HCPs to circumvent the ESA’s Section 9 take prohibition.
A. Designing Participation’s Role
The success of the San Bruno HCP approach of comprehensive, longterm planning relied in part on bringing together for thorough discussion a
broad range of parties that represented different stakes in the problem.
Providing opportunities for all affected parties to interact with Service
officials in the plan formation and implementation processes would serve to
increase (1) the information available regarding the various interests and
proposed plan’s possible effects and alternatives, (2) the likelihood of
affected parties’ support for the plan, and (3) the likelihood of successful
implementation and enforcement of the plan.79 The prototype forum for
participation was the multilateral stakeholder steering committee, which
allowed interested and affected parties to participate in setting plan
objectives, providing and reviewing data on the impacts and alternatives of
the proposed take, and deliberating on the appropriate mitigation and
recovery plan for species.80 Though affected parties are not provided a veto
power on an HCP’s provisions, they are given substantial access and
meaningful opportunities to participate—resulting in an HCP that most if
not all parties (including environmentalists) considered acceptable.81 By
integrating the various affected parties early and throughout the agreement
formation and implementation processes, collaborative regulation would
77

See STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 133
(2001).
78
See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Endangered Species Habitat Conservation
Planning, http://ecos.fws.gov/conserv_plans/public.jsp (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
79
See, e.g., JEREMY ANDERSON ET AL., BALANCING PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE
INTEREST: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING, A SUMMARY
REPORT 13 (1998).
80
Steering committees are “a group of persons who represent affected interests in a
broad-scale HCP planning area and generally oversee HCP progress and development.”
HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 3-3.
81
See Marsh & Thornton, supra note 45, at 128; BEATLEY, supra note 26, at 17. In
this sense, the original San Bruno HCP construct resembles a multilateral accord that
brings interested stakeholders together to address development-conservation disputes.
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serve to better approximate the public interest than traditional processes that
rely on the habitually under-resourced and overwhelmed Services to
establish the public interest.
Though proponents of the HCP program and Congress emphasized the
value of and need for public participation and detailed information
gathering for the success of HCPs,82 the 1982 amendments were more
elusive. Section 10(a)’s brief language only states that the Services must
afford an “opportunity for public comment” before making findings
regarding the permit application.83 Furthermore, Section 10(c) requires a
minimum of thirty days for interested parties to comment on a permit
application.84 Nonetheless, the Services are provided significant discretion
to shape the timing, amount and types of participation by interested
stakeholders and the public generally in the HCP formation and
implementation processes.85 For example, in response to widespread
criticism regarding the lack of meaningful participation opportunities for
non-applicant stakeholders in the HCP process, the Services opted to
lengthen the minimum public comment period required for larger HCPs.86
Though the Services did not vary the type or extent of participation or even
try to synchronize participation opportunities to when key decisions were
being made, they nonetheless demonstrated the flexibility they have in
shaping participation in the HCP process.
Although the 1982 amendments did not add any new express
participation requirements, some early HCPs nonetheless relied on the San
Bruno HCP approach. These HCPs incorporated rigorous scientific data
during HCP development and substantial opportunities for participation
during the HCP process’s information gathering, negotiation and
implementation phases.87 This led many government officials, developers

82

See supra notes 47 - 53 and accompanying text.
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (2000).
84
See id. § 1539(c); 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(c) (2005) (FWS implementing regulations); Id.
§ 222.24(a) (NMFS implementing regulations).
85
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 22.
86
The Services extended the comment period to sixty days except for “low effect”
HCPs (thirty days), individual permits under a program-level HCP (thirty days), and largescale, regional, or exceptionally complex HCPs (ninety days unless there was significant
public participation during HCP development). See HCP Handbook Addendum, supra note
8, at 35,242, 35,256.
87
See Laura Watchman et al., Science & Uncertainty in Habitat Conservation
Planning, 89 AMERICAN SCIENTIST 4, 4 (2001); Thornton, supra note 2, at 631-32.
83
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and environmentalists to support the HCP process as a valuable model for
resolving complex and contentious conservation/development conflicts.88
However, as the HCP program has grown, the Services have interpreted
the ESA’s flexibility regarding participation to consign any multilateral,
collaborative procedures to the whim of the applicant. The Services take
the position that other than a brief comment period provided immediately
before HCP approval, any outside involvement throughout the HCP
formation and implementation processes is at the applicant’s subjective
discretion.89 The Services do claim to strongly encourage integrating public
input throughout the HCP process,90 but do not require it. The Services
justify this interpretation based on the statutory language that it is the
applicant who “submits to the Secretary a conservation plan”91 and claim
that the ESA only requires an “opportunity for public comment” before the
Service finally approves the plan.92 Because of these provisions, the
Services assert that the HCP is the applicant’s plan on which they cannot
impose participation restrictions until after the application is formally
submitted and deemed complete.93
Yet nothing in these brief statutory provisions precludes requiring other
interested stakeholders to have access to any early and ongoing negotiations
about the framework and composition of the HCP, or to be able to comment
or even participate in the scoping of the plan.94 Indeed, the statute does not
88

See Steve Vanderheiden, Habitat Conservation Plans and the Promise of
Deliberative Democracy, PUBLIC INTEGRITY 205, 209 (2001).
89
See HCP Handbook Addendum, supra note 8, at 35,246-47 (“[W]e maintain that
the inclusion of other interested parties in the development of an HCP is ultimately the
decision of the applicant. The ESA and its implementing regulations do not mandate public
participation before an applicant submits a permit application; only a public comment
period after it is submitted and published in the Federal Register.”).
90
See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 3-3 (“[T]he Services should encourage the
applicant to provide opportunities to brief or inform representatives of interested parties of
key elements or issues to be addressed in the proposed HCP.”); HCP Handbook
Addendum, supra note 8, at 35,247 (“We strongly encourage applicants to include more
public participation at all stages of development.”). See also id. at 35,256 (“The Services
will strongly encourage potential applicants to allow for public participation during the
development of an HCP, particularly if non-Federal public agencies … are involved.”).
91
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (2000).
92
Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B).
93
See Jon Luoma, Habitat-Conservation Plans: Compromise or Capitulation?,
AUDUBON 43 (Jan-Feb 1998). Indeed, one past FWS director claimed that “[i]f we had our
druthers, we’d certainly open up the HCP process to more public involvement. But the
way the law’s written, it’s not our HCP.” Id.
94
See NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, WHERE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BIODIVERSITY
CONVERGE: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING 20 n.85
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require any negotiations between Service staff and the developer-applicant
over a plan’s provisions before the draft plan is formally submitted. These
bare statutory provisions also do not mandate that any negotiations that do
occur before formal application submittal must occur without any access or
opportunity for input by other interested stakeholders. Other than making
the bare assertion that they do not have the authority to shape participation
requirements, the Services provide no additional support for their claim.
Significantly, the steering committee feature key to the original HCP’s
success is not required under the Services’ interpretation. Though the
Services permit the use of steering committees throughout the HCP process
and emphasize their possible utility to applicants, an applicant can simply
refuse such a working group.95 When used, steering committee members
are appointed by the applicant-developer.96
As with the negotiation of HCPs, the Services also authorize subsequent
alterations to HCPs without the involvement of other stakeholders. In fact,
the Services encourage making some amendments to HCPs or ITPs
informally, away from the scrutiny of non-applicant stakeholders.97 While
the Services do allow the involvement of “other stakeholders to help
identify the alternative strategies,” and the use of both scientific advisory
committees and independent peer review to examine a monitoring program,
they again leave such involvement to the total discretion of the applicant.98
Whether in a concerted effort to persuade developers to enter into HCPs,99 a
(2000) (“Other federal statutes allow stakeholders to help shape natural resource use and
protection. …Nothing in the ESA precludes the Services from employing similar measures
to involve the public in the HCP development process.”).
95
See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 3-3, 3-4 (explaining applicants may decline
such processes if they view them as “giving ‘outside interests’ too much access,” or allow
for “the intrusion of outside interests into proprietary or sensitive economic matters.”).
96
See id. at 3-3.
97
See id. at 3-33. Though limited to situations where an adopted HCP included
“specific procedures for incorporating minor amendments so that the public had an
opportunity to comment on the process,” such procedures allow a developer-applicant to
make subsequent changes to the HCP without public input as long as the net effect on the
species is not “significantly different” than analyzed when the HCP was approved. Id.
98
HCP Handbook Addendum, supra note 8, at 35,253.
99
Several commenters have noted that the Services’ developer-friendly interpretations
are a result of President Clinton’s Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt’s calculated decision to
expand usage of ITPs. See John Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of the
Interior: A Preliminary View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199, 213-14 (2001) (Interior Department
Solicitor’s account); David Dana & Susan Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 511-512 (1999); Ruhl, supra note 72, at 936 (“Babbitt
not only stuck to the HCP program reforms in the face of intense opposition from
preservationists, he broadened them … with adaptive management as the central
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belief in their expertise100 and the triviality of participation,101 or simply a
reticence toward change and learning, the Services have failed to establish
any requirement or substantial incentive for applicants to engage other
parties.
B. Devaluing Participation
The Services’ decision to merely encourage multilateral stakeholder
participation and only require a short, post-negotiation public comment
period has been the determining factor shaping the role of participation in
the HCP program. Existing evidence substantiates that the Services’
interpretations simply fail to value participation or link it to when it might
serve a useful function: when information is being gathered, perspectives
are being shaped, alternatives are being considered, and actual decisions are
being made.
Though published studies by the Services are nonexistent, existing
independent data demonstrates that the “vast majority” of adopted HCPs are
subject to little if any participation from the public or interested
stakeholders during HCP formation and approval.102 A comprehensive
University of Michigan analysis determined that outside stakeholders were
involved in less than forty percent of the HCPs studied.103 Unfortunately,
implementation approach.”). Cf. A. Dan Tarlock, Slouching Toward Eden: The EcoPragmatic Challenges Of Ecosystem Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1199 (2003) (“[T]he
Babbitt Department of Interior promoted AM [adaptive management] to induce stakeholder
participation in large-scale, multi-species HCPs, as a way to counter efforts to roll back the
ESA”).
100
See infra notes 313 – 320 and accompanying text.
101
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 30.
102
John Kostyack, Habitat Conservation Planning: Time to Give Conservationists and
Other Concerned Citizens a Seat at the Table, 14 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 51, 52
(1997). See also HOOD, supra note 29, at 43-44; ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 9;
Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participation in the Era of Reinvention: The
Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 713 (1999); Michael Lipske,
Giving Rare Creatures A Fighting Chance, 36 NATIONAL WILDLIFE 2, 4 (1998)
(“Landowners and government representatives hammer out the details behind closed doors.
Public review typically occurs only after the plan has been created.”).
103
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 17. Though applicants were moderately or
actively involved before the comment period in 91% of the HCPs studied, not even one
environmental group was at least moderately involved before the comment period in 51%
of the HCPs. See STEVEN YAFFEE ET AL., BALANCING PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE
INTEREST: AN INVESTIGATION OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN HABITAT CONSERVATION
PLANNING 5-3, 5-5 (1998). In only a minority of cases did local governments (40%),
business groups (28%), or independent scientists (28%) so participate prior to the comment
period. See id. at 5-5, 5-6, 5-9. Even the higher local government participation level is
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though the HCP process provides considerable opportunities for negotiation
over the scope of development and species conservation,104 this negotiation
is usually restricted to the applicant and Service staff.105
Other stakeholders are habitually relegated to a comment period that is
both cursory106 and late,107 usually after the key aspects of the plan have
been negotiated extensively over a long period.108 In contrast, existing
evidence shows that participation is more likely to affect an HCP the earlier
that it occurs in the process.109 This evidence is consistent with empirical
studies analyzing other regulatory processes.110 Unfortunately, participation
misleading; the study found that local government participation was closely correlated with
whether the government owned land subject to the HCP. See id. at 5-5.
104
See David Moser, Habitat-Conservation Plans Under the U.S. Endangered Species
Act: The Legal Perspective, 26 Environmental Management S7, S10 (2000) (stating HCPs
are “rarely submitted to the FWS ‘cold,’ … FWS strongly prefers to work with applicants
in developing the HCP.”).
105
See Kostyack, supra note 102, at 52.
106
See YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 103, at A-Weyerhaeuser-5 (“Many considered the
time provided for public review ‘woefully inadequate considering the technical issues
involved and the difficulty in getting documents.’”) (citing environmental representatives).
107
See Barbara Pederzoli, Public Participation and Biological Soundness in Habitat
Conservation Plans, MASTER’S THESIS, SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY 75 (1999) (finding
participation occurred during early design phase in only eight of thirty HCPs studied
(27%)); ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 17 (finding outside stakeholders “tended to be
more involved during the comment periods … than during earlier phases of the planning
process when most key HCP decisions are made.”).
108
See Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck chairs: Endangered Species Act
Reforms in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WILL. & MARY ENVIR. J. 227, 309 (1998);
Luoma, supra note 93, at 43 (“[O]nce HCPs receive that preliminary approval, the details
are published in The Federal Register, and public comment is considered. But in many
cases federal regulators have by that point already been closely involved in developing the
HCP. … Fish and Wildlife Service officials have frequently provided extensive technical
support … and engaged in detailed give–and–take negotiating…. Public notice … comes
only when the giving and taking is over.”).
109
See YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 103, at 5-13 (“[O]n average more significant
changes occurred before the comment period than during the comment period, or after HCP
approval.”); ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at xv (“[I]n those cases where public
participation resulted in substantive changes to the HCPs, public participation invariably
began early in the process.”).
110
See Stephanie Tai, Three Asymmetries of Informed Environmental Decisionmaking,
78 TEMPLE L. REV 659, 693 (2005); Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional
Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1062
(2005) (describing the Administrative Procedures Act’s call for widespread public
participation in the early stages of rulemaking, before policy decisions get “chiseled into
bureaucratic stone”); Mary Grisez Kweit & Robert W. Kweit, The Politics of Policy
Analysis: The Role of Citizen Participation in Analytic Decision Making, in CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING, 19, 25-26 (Jack DeSario & Stuart Langton
eds., 1987) (describing negative practical impacts of providing participation opportunities
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rarely makes a difference in the HCP program111 because outside
stakeholders typically are allowed to the drafting table only after the HCP is
drafted.112 In the rare circumstances when included in plan formation by
developers, stakeholders tend to be involved only in providing information
or reviewing technical data and not in deliberations as to the terms of the
HCP.113 Even when early public briefings provide the public an
opportunity for input, the applicant typically still controls the process.114
Weak stakeholder involvement is particularly egregious for HCPs in
which the applicant was a private developer rather than a public body.115
Two comprehensive studies have found that the level of participation
voluntarily provided by the applicant was highly correlated with whether
the permittee was a private or public entity.116 These typically larger,
only later in decision-making process)..
111
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at xv (“[P]ublic participation resulted in
significant substantive changes to only three out of forty-five responding HCPs.”). See
also id. (finding in more than seventy-five percent of the HCPs studied, public participation
led to “only minimal or moderate changes”).
112
See, e.g., YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 103, at A-Orange County-9 (quoting local
government administrator as stating: “The problem was people felt they had already missed
the point to really affect the plan and that decisions were already made. So a lesson we
learned … is the need to do more public workshops before the comment period—when it is
easier to make adjustments.”).
113
See David Ostermeier et al., Habitat Conservation Planning: Current Processes
and Tomorrow’s Challenges, 2 ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICE 166, 172 (2000).
114
See, e.g., YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 103, at A-Weyerhaeuser-4.
Certainly, for most development projects necessitating an HCP, there typically are
other local and/or state government fora (e.g., local development permitting) at which
stakeholders may have the opportunity to provide input on the proposed development. As
a result, focusing exclusively on HCP participation may underestimate the extent of
participation opportunities available, as some of the informational and other values of
participation that are not attained through the HCP formation process may to a limited
extent be provided in one of these other nodes of participation. Yet it would be a mistake
to suggest that the existence of these fragmented and uncoordinated fora could come close
to resolving the participation limitations of the HCP program. Beyond the certain
inefficiency of this fragmented approach, the conservation questions considered in HCP
deliberations are often only tangentially attended to in these other fora.
115
See Ostermeier et al., supra note 113, at 170.
116
See YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 103, at 4-13, 5-5 (finding 88% of HCP processes
employing low levels of participation (minimal interest group involvement, no steering
committee, and no independent scientific review) involved strictly private lands, while only
12% involved public lands). In contrast, 11% of HCP processes providing high levels of
participation (multiple interest groups, early involvement, a steering committee, and
typically independent scientific review) regulated strictly private lands, while 89%
involved public lands. See id. See also Ostermeier et al., supra note 113, at 170 (“Of the
thirteen private cases, none had representative participation, six had expanded participation
and seven involved only the applicant and service representatives. For public plans, fifteen
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regional HCPs by necessity incorporate substantially more stakeholder
participation than private, single-project HCPs. Not coincidentally, local
and state officials are more likely than private developers to have the
political incentives or obligation under state or local law to provide public
participation opportunities before submittal of application materials to the
Services.117 Yet, even state agency applicants have treated the public
review process as a token exercise in certain instances.118
Existing evidence also shows that very few HCPs processes include
independent scientists in scientific or technical review committees, and
even fewer use independent scientific peer review at any stage of the HCP’s
development.119 Any independent scientist involvement typically occurs
only after negotiation or initial HCP implementation, and even then only “at
the behest of the outside scientist, not as a result of solicited peer review,”
or “as part of routine practice in the formulation of a habitat conservation
plan.”120 As a result, any independent scientific assessments of proposed
HCPs tend to come when the chances for changing elements of the plan are
slim, relegating science to at best the role of “an adversarial interest at the
approval stage rather than a shaping influence at the foundational stage.”121
In short, too little information is made available too late to many interested
parties who have an ability to contribute substantively to the HCP’s terms.
This is an unfortunate loss not only to those stakeholders, but also
regulatory experimentation and ultimately habitat conservation.
of eighteen were either representative or expanded with the remaining three involving the
service and permittee only.”). This study defined “expanded” participation as “one or more
individuals or representatives beyond that required” and “representative” participation as
“those in which the intent was to involve representatives of all interests.” Id. at 169.
117
See, e.g., YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 103, at A-Clark County-6 (quoting facilitator
as stating “ESA matters are explosive and most government entities love it when the
enviros walk hand in hand with the biggest developer in the region and request in unison
for them to do something. The decision becomes relatively easy then.”).
118
See, e.g., Thomas Lippe & Kathy Bailey, Regulation of Logging on Private Land in
California Under Governor Gray Davis, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 351, 396 (2001)
(quoting superior court decision finding state agency failed to follow its mandated public
review procedures as stating “[a] believer in orchestration might reasonably conclude [the
agency’s] actions were intentionally executed to prevent public exposure or comment.”).
119
Data from an unpublished database indicates that independent scientists were
involved in scientific or technical committees in only fourteen percent of the 274 HCPs
approved before 1999, and less than eight percent of HCP processes integrated independent
scientific peer review at any stage of the HCP’s development. See DEFENDERS OF
WILDLIFE, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN DATABASE, Questions 30, 31, available at
http://www.defenders.org/hcp/guide.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2006) (hereinafter
“DEFENDERS HCP DATABASE”).
120
NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, supra note 94, at 19.
121
Id. at 20.

DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE, QUOTE OR REPRODUCE

22

MAKING REGULATION EVOLVE

[14-Aug-06

Similar data exists for the HCP implementation stage as well. Because
the Services leave to the developer’s discretion whether to use a scientific
advisory committee or independent peer review during HCP
implementation,122 most HCPs rely exclusively on applicant reporting and
limited Service oversight.123 External monitoring and oversight is largely
absent.124 Other affected parties are typically shut out during interpretation
of HCP provisions.125 In fact, the Services have stated in agency guidance
that no other stakeholders should be allowed to enforce an HCP’s terms.126
Despite the Services’ claims to actively encourage participation in the
HCP process,127 substantial evidence suggests otherwise. The Services
continue to habitually treat “participation as a procedural burden,” “a
legally required step in an approval process that must be completed as
quickly and effortlessly as possible.”128 Stakeholders seeking to participate
often have to rely on laborious Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)129
requests even to obtain access to the products of Service/developer
negotiations.130 Researchers also point to additional Service policies that
actively hinder meaningful participation.131 For example, the Services’
permit processing schedules, in some cases self-imposed and in others
negotiated with the applicant, have led to hasty approvals despite
stakeholder appeals for additional time and a Service official’s recognition
that “we ended up without enough time to review things thoroughly.”132 A

122

See HCP Handbook Addendum, supra note 8, at 35,253.
See DEFENDERS HCP DATABASE, supra note 119, at Question 31 (revealing that
fewer than eight percent of 274 HCP processes integrated independent scientific peer
review at any stage of the HCP’s development).
124
See Thomas, supra note 33, at 115. One study found that though applicants were at
least moderately involved in 85% of responding HCPs during the implementation phase, in
only a minority were environmental groups (40%), business and development groups
(23%), or independent scientists (15%) at least moderately involved. See YAFFEE ET AL.,
supra note 103, at 5-3, 5-5, 5-6, 5-9. In fact, in only one out of fifteen HCPs did a FWS
official report that “the public was very involved in the monitoring of HCP
implementation.” See id. at 5-8.
125
See Lippe & Bailey, supra note 118, at 393.
126
See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at app. 9, Template HCP Implementation
Agreement § 14.8; Plater, supra note 44, at 872.
127
See supra note 90.
128
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 23.
129
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000 & Supp. II 2003).
130
See, e.g., Luoma, supra note 93, at 42-43. See also infra note 251.
131
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 21, 22.
132
Id.
123
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federal court has also found that the Services have stonewalled attempts to
even comment on proposed plans.133
Likewise, though the National Environmental Policy Act’s134
requirement of the preparation and disclosure of an environmental impact
statement (EIS) for certain federal actions135 provides another potential
opportunity for more in-depth stakeholder involvement, the Services
application of NEPA serves to limit rather than increase such input. The
EIS process includes public opportunities to comment through early open
“scoping” meetings on the impacts of and alternatives to the proposed
action, as well as requiring responses to comments made on the project.136
However, the Services almost never require ITP applications to follow the
EIS process, almost always recommending applicants prepare a much
briefer environmental assessment137 or categorically excluding an HCP
from NEPA review.138 These exceptions to the EIS process avoid the EIS’s
early participation opportunities, extended public comment period, detailed
evaluation of impacts and alternatives,139 and the requirement that the
Services respond to comments.140
In contrast with the majority of HCP processes that at best tolerate
minimal participation in the HCP process, where applicants (almost always
government entities) voluntarily opened up the negotiations to stakeholders,
the instrumental value of such participation has been impressive.141 In one
study, 94% of FWS officials reported “that public participation increased
the quality of information available to develop HCPs.”142 The increase in
133

See, e.g., Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reprimanding FWS
for withholding from public a key map showing location of mitigation, stating “an agency
may not turn the provision of notice into a bureaucratic game of hide and seek.”).
134
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (2000).
135
NEPA requires preparation of an EIS for any major federal action (including permit
approval) significantly affecting the quality of the environment. See id. § 4322(2)(C).
136
See HOOD, supra note 29, at 44; ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 22.
137
See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in
Takings and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 380 (1997) (revealing ninety-nine percent of
HCPs approved between 1994 and 1996 were accompanied only by environmental
assessments); Doremus, supra note 102, at 713; Kostyack, supra note 102, at 53.
138
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 22.
139
See Doremus, supra note 102, at 713.
140
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 22. Even when an EIS is required, though
it may require an opportunity for stakeholders to provide comments before negotiations
occur, it does not require stakeholders access to the negotiations themselves. See id. at 24.
141
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 9; Thomas, supra note 33, at 111.
142
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 13. Cf. YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 103, at AWeyerhaeuser-8 (quoting applicant as stating participation broadened the values and
options considered during deliberations).
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information also serves to decrease misperceptions and increase trust.143
Another study found 75% of HCP participants “reported that collaborating
on an HCP improved subsequent working relationships between the
participants.”144 This increased trust may in turn increase the likelihood of
HCP approval and implementation and decrease the likelihood of
litigation.145 Perhaps most importantly, studies found that both participants
and outside observers more widely support HCPs crafted with substantial
and early opportunities for public input146 and view such HCPs to be better
quality HCPs.147 In short, most stakeholders (including applicants) in the
more collaborative HCP processes asserted “the benefits of representative
participation outweighed their associated problems.”148 In fact, the Services
officially assert that their experience reveals there is a direct relationship
between the extent of public participation in the plan approval process and
the extent both participants and outsiders believe an HCP is effective.149
Conversely, little data appears to exist supporting the Services’
approach to participation. No evidence exists that providing a public
143

See id. at A-Weyerhaeuser-8 (quoting applicant employee stating that public
participation can “help diffuse misperceptions from growing out of control.”); id. at AOrange County-5 (quoting environmental group representative stating in-depth
participation through steering committee “allowed us time to understand how the plan
developed and evolved—and it is easier to accept it if you understand the series of stepwise decisions that occurred…. [It] was useful and allowed us to check for understanding
by greatly facilitating communication beyond what you would ever get from written
comments and hearings.”).
144
Jeff J. Opperman & Paola Bernazzani, Comparing Perspectives Of Participants &
Outside Commentators On Habitat Conservation Plans, 20 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE
3, 5 (2003).
145
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 13; Thomas, supra note 33, at 112. See
also YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 103, at A-Clark County-6 (local administrator reporting
that many stakeholders believed the steering committee provided a superior forum for
resolving species conservation disputes).
146
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 11, 13 (“HCPs with greater levels of public
participation tend to have higher and broader levels of outside stakeholder satisfaction.”);
NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, supra note 94, at 21 (“[T]he degree of public acceptance
of an HCP is strongly related to the degree of public participation in the development of the
plan.”).
147
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 4. See also id. at A-Weyerhaeuser-7
(quoting FWS official stating “participation makes all of the difference in the world in
terms of product”); Ostermeier et al., supra note 113, at 170 (reporting participants
believed multilateral process led to “better conservation activities.”); Dan Silver, Natural
Community Conservation Planning: 1997 Interim Report, 14 ENDANGERED SPECIES
UPDATE 22, 24 (1997) (affirming the useful contributions provided by numerous
stakeholder groups in a particularly inclusive HCP process).
148
Ostermeier et al., supra note 113, at 170.
149
See HCP Handbook Addendum, supra note 8, at 35,246.
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comment period after bilateral negotiations is the optimal participation
approach, whether for fostering an engaged civic community or gathering
information to cultivate quality HCPs. Put another way, no evidence has
been published establishing that having the applicant assess the value of the
benefits of multilateral stakeholder participation against the strategic value
of restricted participation is more likely to lead to an optimal level of
participation and information than having the Services perform that role.
To be sure, the Services cannot reasonably contend that the applicant
and Services typically have more than enough information on which to
formulate an adequate HCP without the benefit of additional data, or that
they use the most rigorous methods for obtaining information. Many
scientists have criticized the Service for ignoring scientific standards of
independent peer review of the data used to formulate HCPs.150 The
Services rely primarily on the applicant’s consultants to provide the
biological information to support the HCP, with often overstretched Service
scientists reviewing the information for adequacy.151 These independent
critics understandably question the scientific credibility of HCPs not
evaluated by scientists who do not have a stake in the outcome.152
Furthermore, scientists have consistently criticized the HCP formation
process as regularly lacking even basic scientific data. Comprehensive
biological studies confirm that approximately half of approved HCPs are
adopted without even minimally necessary information about basic trends
of species at issue153 or even the proposed take’s effect on the species.154 A
150

See Jocelyn Kaiser, When a Habitat is Not a Home: Many Ecologists Say
Conservation Plans Designed to Ease Tensions Between Landowners and
Environmentalists are Not Grounded in Good Science, 276 SCIENCE 1636, 1636 (1997);
PETER KAREIVA ET AL., USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS, AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 5 (1999); F. James, Lessons Learned from a Study of
Habitat Conservation Planning, 49 BIOSCIENCE 871 (1999).
151
See HOOD, supra note 29, at 80.
152
See id.
153
See Watchman et al., supra note 87, at 4 (“[E]ven general trends (whether the
species was improving or declining) were unknown for 49 percent of the species addressed
by the reviewed HCPs.”); Elaine Harding et al., The Scientific Foundations of Habitat
Conservation Plans: A Quantitative Assessment, 15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 488 (2001).
154
See KAREIVA ET AL., supra note 150, at 3 (“[F]or only 56% of the instances in
which a listed species might be ‘taken’ by an activity was the predicted take quantitatively
estimated. And only 25% (23 of 97) of species treatments included both a quantitative
estimate of take and an adequate assessment of the impact of that take.”); Id. at 4 (“In many
cases, we found that crucial, yet basic, information on species is unavailable for preparers
of HCPs. … For example, in only one-third of the species assessments was there enough
information to evaluate what proportion of the population would be affected by a proposed
take.”); Watchman et al., supra note 87, at 4 (“47 of the 97 cases examined presented no

DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE, QUOTE OR REPRODUCE

26

MAKING REGULATION EVOLVE

[14-Aug-06

2006 study learned that all but one of the twenty-two multi-species HCPs
evaluated failed to confirm that all species included in the HCP were even
present in the plan area, with a full forty-one percent of the total species
covered unconfirmed.155 Additionally, measures included in HCPs to
minimize or mitigate the proposed take’s impact often are not speciesspecific,156 are based on insufficient data,157 or even ignore existing data.158
As a result, almost half of HCPs failed to include sufficient measures to
offset the expected take,159 sometimes leading to disastrous results.160
Because of these inadequacies, a group of prominent conservation
biologists concluded that many HCPs “have been developed without
adequate scientific guidance,” and aggravate rather than alleviate threats to
endangered species.161

estimate of how many individuals would be taken as a result of the proposed activities, and
an additional 21 cases gave estimates that were so vague as to provide little aid to
planners.”); DEFENDERS HCP DATABASE, supra note 119, at Questions 13, 14 (data
revealing 50% of 274 HCPs did not estimate how many of the species would be killed or
harmed, while 86% did not quantify the projected impact on the species’ population on a
local, regional or global level). A 2005 investigative report found (1) 45% (41 of 92) of
HCPs failed to quantify the number of listed species in the plan area, and (2) 57% (52 of
91) failed to quantify the number likely impacted by the proposed take. See Robert
McClure & Lisa Stiffler, Troubled Plans, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 4, 2005, at
A12, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/dayart/20050504/PIanalysisFIX1.gif (last
visited Aug. 14, 2006).
155
See Matthew Rahn et al., Species Coverage in Multispecies Habitat Conservation
Plans: Where’s the Science?, 56 BIOSCIENCE 613, 615 (2006).
156
See id. at 616 (finding nearly two-thirds of species included in HCP but
unconfirmed to exist in plan area lacked species-specific conservation measures).
157
See KAREIVA ET AL., supra note 150, at 3 (“Overall, particular mitigation measures
commonly suffered from an absence of data indicating they were likely to succeed, leading
to a situation in which “unproven” mitigation measures were relied on in the HCPs”);
Watchman et al., supra note 87, at 4 (“[T]he team also found that the specific mitigation
strategies chosen often lacked sufficient data to demonstrate their efficacy.”); DEFENDERS
HCP DATABASE, supra note 119, at Question 25 (finding 84% of 274 HCPs did not provide
evidence or cite references that mitigation would work for each species listed on permit).
158
See Watchman et al., supra note 87, at 5.
159
See KAREIVA ET AL., supra note 150, at 26 (“Overall, for only 57% of the species in
the sample did mitigation measures proposed in the HCP address the primary threat to the
species to a degree considered ‘sufficient’ or better.”).
160
See Watchman et al., supra note 87, at 4 (“In perhaps the worst example, several
HCPs relied heavily on relocation of threatened Utah prairie dogs …, despite a study
available to plan preparers concluding that nearly 80 percent of 480 Utah prairie dogs
disappeared or died within three months following relocation. In this case, the proposed
mitigation strategy was little better than killing the animals outright.”).
161
Dennis Murphy et al., A Statement on Proposed Private Land Initiatives and
Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act from the Meeting of Scientists at Stanford
University, March 31, 1997, in THE SCIENCE OF CONSERVATION PLANNING 214 (1997).
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Given the insufficient data on which many HCPs are based, the Services
cannot claim that requiring the participation of interested stakeholders and
independent peer review would be wasteful and superfluous. Nor have
they; though not the norm, the Services in some cases have recognized the
usefulness of nonprofit organizations in providing information and
assistance in managing habitat.162 However, by systemically ignoring the
potential scientific resources available, the Services not only raise questions
about the objectivity of the information used to make HCP decisions but
also contravene the statutory mandate to base permit decisions on the “best
scientific information available.”163
Finally, though the extent that the Services have yielded to now-familiar
concerns of agency capture may be difficult to ascertain through empirical
evidence, it is clear that the Services’ bilateral approach to the HCP
program provides opportunities for capture that did not exist under Section
9’s strict and non-negotiable prohibition. The potential for capture is not
aided by the fact that courts are quite deferential in reviewing Service
approval of HCPs and, except in egregious situations, do not serve as a
significant restraint on negotiations between an applicant and the
Services.164 By providing applicants a crucial strategic role in shaping an
HCP, the program grants such regulatory actors considerable influence over
162

See Lee Breckenridge, Nonprofit Environmental Organizations and the
Restructuring of Institutions for Ecosystem management, 25 ECOLOGY L. Q. 692, 697
(1999).
163
Dennis Murphy et al., supra note 161, at 218.
164
In the program’s twenty-five years, only seven reported opinions have considered
Service approval of an HCP (five reviewing initial approvals and two reviewing amended
approvals after judicial invalidation). Four opinions invalidated permit approval. See
Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 175 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (invalidating permit because FWS
did not allow public access to a key mitigation map for the HCP); Sierra Club v. Babbitt,
15 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1279 (S.D.Ala. 1998) (invalidating two permits authorizing take of
Alabama Beach Mouse because FWS ignored expert opinions); Sierra Club v. Norton, 207
F.Supp.2d 1310 (S.D.Ala. 2002) (enjoining permit approval for take of Alabama Beach
Mouse again); National Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1292 (E.D.Cal.
2000) (invalidating Natomas Basin HCP because FWS failed to provide any economic
analysis or even landowner representations supporting decision that chosen mitigation was
the maximum extent practicable).
However, the opinions upholding permit approval demonstrate the wide discretion
provided to the Services. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 202
F.Supp.2d 594, 622 (W.D.Tex. 2002) (upholding permit approval on ground that absence
of evidence that mitigation is not the maximum extent practicable is sufficient).
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, Fla., 120 F.Supp.2d
1005 (M.D.Fla. 2000) (upholding permit approval despite evidence of repeated permit
noncompliance by applicant); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Norton, No. CIV-S-04-0579 DFL JF,
2005 WL 2175874 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 7, 2005) (upholding subsequently revised Natomas
Basin HCP).
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long-term policy decisions that substantially affect a wide range of interests.
While this involvement on its own may be benign and indeed valuable in
determining the optimal conservation plan, the Services delegation to the
applicant of the primary role of determining who else gets to participate
meaningfully makes the applicant’s disproportionate influence over
conservation decisions foreseeable, and perhaps inevitable.165
III. A RETICENCE TOWARD INNOVATIVE IMPLEMENTATION
In contrast with the Services’ narrow interpretations of the role of the
public and stakeholders in the HCP program, from the outset the HCP
program incorporated requirements that sought, in albeit limited fashion, to
both foster monitoring of plan implementation and encourage continued
adaptation of HCPs. However, like the development of the HCP program’s
participation provisions, Service interpretations of the program’s
monitoring and adaptation requirements have provided applicants and the
Services considerable flexibility and incentives to ignore monitoring and
evade adaptation. Consequently, as detailed in this Part, HCP monitoring
and adaptation have both fallen exceedingly short of their potential.
A. Examining the Role of Monitoring
Because as currently structured the HCP program relies so heavily on
the applicant-developer to be the principal monitor of the effect of the
approved take and the effectiveness of adopted conservation measures in
achieving HCP objectives, monitoring under the HCP program requires a
high level of faith that permittees have both the incentive and ability to
assess conformity with public goals on their own. To date there is little
evidence that such trust is warranted.
1. Devolving Monitoring Responsibilities
Reliable and proficient monitoring procedures are a minimum
requirement for promoting compliance and ensuring the legitimacy of even
traditional command-and-control regulation, and certainly are critical to an
adaptive regulatory approach. In a collaborative governance paradigm,
monitoring and adaptation of regulatory decisions can serve the critical role
of fostering accountability and legitimacy by ensuring that decisions
account for the evolving character of complex systems and the existence of
165

As one FWS official expressed, the Services expect staff to follow a “satisfied
customer” approach to the HCP program, “with the applicant being considered the only
customer.” ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 21-23.
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uncertainty when the initial regulatory decision is made.166 An HCP can
only be coherently adapted to account for new information or changed
circumstances if the take’s impacts, species and habitat condition, and
adopted conservation mitigation program are monitored to assess whether
such information or circumstances have occurred.167 This is particularly
necessary in the common circumstance where significant uncertainties
regarding existing conditions, the project’s effects and the mitigation’s
effectiveness are present.168 Indeed, the Services expressly acknowledge
the various critical functions monitoring can perform in the regulatory
process: (1) as a check to ensure HCP compliance; (2) to assess a permitted
take’s impacts on the species as compared to projected impacts, which
might trigger a need for alteration of mitigation measures; (3) to signal
when new conditions arise in the plan area that might require adaptation of
the HCP; (4) to assess progress toward the HCP’s biological goals and
objectives, for possible adaptation of the HCP; and (5) to provide data for
evaluation of existing HCP strategies for possible use or modification for
future HCPs or other regulatory programs.169
As a result, the Services’ implementing regulations have always
required HCPs to specify the monitoring measures to be used during plan
implementation, directing the Services to impose “monitoring and reporting
requirements deemed necessary for determining whether [the ITP’s] terms
and conditions are being complied with.”170 Monitoring must be based on
“sound science,” and “previously established monitoring protocols,” using a
“multispecies approach when appropriate.”171 However, though monitoring
procedures must be incorporated in all HCPs, neither the ESA nor the
implementing regulations specify who must conduct the monitoring, leaving
considerable discretion to the negotiating parties to shape an HCP’s
monitoring program. Conceivably, the parties might rely on the Services to

166

See Camacho, supra note 3, at 296.
See K. Shawn Smallwood et al., Environmental Auditing: Indicators Assessment for
Habitat Conservation Plan of Yolo County, California, USA, 22 ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT 947 (1998) (discussing need for assessment of ecological indicators in HCPs
to ensure habitat remains suitable to sustain species); Watchman et al., supra note 87, at 5.
168
See Habitat Conservations Plans: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries,
Wildlife, and Drinking Water of the Comm. on Envtl. & Pub. Works, 106th Cong. 150
(1999) (statement of Monica Medina, General Counsel, NOAA) (“Because HCPs are at the
limits of our scientific capability and knowledge, extensive monitoring and adaptive
management strategies are essential.”).
169
See id.
170
50 C.F.R. §17.22(b)(3) (endangered species), §17.32(b)(3) (2005) (threatened
species). See also id. § 222.307(d) (NMFS reporting and inspection regulations).
171
HCP Handbook Addendum, supra note 8, at 35,254.
167
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perform the monitoring functions exclusively, or encourage the various
stakeholders to participate in oversight activities.
Through agency guidelines, however, the Services have opted to place
the key monitoring functions primarily in the hands of the applicantdeveloper. The Services organize the HCP program’s monitoring activities
into compliance monitoring and “effect and effectiveness” monitoring
functions.172 While compliance monitoring is limited to verifying permittee
compliance with the HCP’s terms, the bulk of monitoring activities fall
within effect and effectiveness monitoring—including evaluating the
development’s effects on the plan area, the continued validity of
“assumptions and predictions made when the HCP was developed and
approved,” and whether the HCP is “achieving the biological goals and
objectives.”173 Despite the breadth of effects and effectiveness monitoring,
Services regulations primarily assign all such monitoring to the applicant
and make the Services primarily responsible only for compliance
monitoring.174 Furthermore, just as for the HCP formation process, Service
interpretations leave full discretion to the applicant concerning whether to
configure the plan’s monitoring protocols to allow others to be even
peripherally involved.175
2. Violating Monitoring Requirements
As a result of these interpretations, the limited evidence that exists on
biological monitoring under the HCP program suggests that the vast
majority of HCPs do not provide adequate monitoring programs.176 The
Services usually offer little assistance on how to construct a scientifically
172

Id. at 35,253.
Id. at 35,253. See also id. at 35,254 (“Effects and effectiveness monitoring
includes, but is not limited to, the following: 1. Periodic accounting of incidental take that
occurred …; 2. Surveys to determine species status…; 3. Assessments of habitat condition;
4. Progress reports on fulfillment of the operating conservation program…; and 5.
Evaluations of the operating conservation program and its progress toward its intended
biological goals.”).
174
See id. at 35,254.
175
At the applicant’s discretion, HCPs may use oversight committees, made up of
“species experts and representatives of the permittee, the Services, and other affected
agencies and entities,” “to ensure proper and periodic review of the monitoring program
and to ensure that each program properly implements the terms and conditions of the
incidental take permit.” Id. at 35,255. Additionally, if the parties so negotiate, nonpermittee parties (including private or public entities) are allowed to conduct all or portions
of the monitoring functions. See id.
176
See Craig Thomas, Habitat Conservation Planning, in FUNG & WRIGHT, supra note
3, at 144, 153-5; Bradley Karkkainen, New Governance in Legal Thought and in the World:
Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 496 (2004).
173
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adequate monitoring program, leaving it to the applicant to develop.177 The
most comprehensive empirical study to date on the science of HCPs, under
the aegis of the American Institute for Biological Sciences, found that
monitoring plans are usually nonexistent or so poorly described as to make
them inadequate as a tool for compliance.178 Only half (twenty-two out of
forty-three) of the HCPs analyzed contained clear “effects and
effectiveness” monitoring programs. 179 Furthermore, only seven (five
percent) of the forty-three HCPs analyzed adopted a monitoring strategy
that was sufficient to evaluate the success of the HCP,180 i.e., the plan’s
effects on the listed species or overall habitat181 or the effectiveness of the
mitigation strategies adopted.182 Other analyses of HCP monitoring
corroborate these results.183
For those HCPs that do include satisfactory monitoring and compliance
programs, there is little evidence that adopted monitoring protocols are
being either implemented by applicants or enforced by the Services.184
Monitoring information is not readily accessible, if it is publicly available at
all.185 However, substantial evidence exists that the Services’ simply do not
employ sufficient staff to closely engage in the monitoring activities to

177

See NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, supra note 94, at 24.
See KAREIVA ET AL., supra note 150, at 28-29.
179
See id. at 28. See also DEFENDERS HCP DATABASE, supra note 119, at Question 36
(results of study revealing 35% of 274 HCPs fail to require effectiveness monitoring, 23%
indicate effectiveness monitoring will be done but provide little description of the program,
33% provide only a general description of what will be monitored, and only 9% contain a
detailed description of an effectiveness monitoring program).
180
See id. See also Wilhere, supra note 32, at 21.
181
See Watchman et al., supra note 87, at 5.
182
See KAREIVA ET AL., supra note 150, at 28-29.
183
A more recent but unscientific investigative report of large HCPs found that 29%
(twenty-seven of ninety-two) of the HCPs reviewed failed to include a monitoring program
at all. See McClure & Stiffler, supra note 154. See also REED NOSS ET AL., THE SCIENCE OF
CONSERVATION PLANNING: HABITAT CONSERVATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT (1997) (finding HCPs typically either completely lacked monitoring procedures or
included only a bare requirement that plans should be modified based on monitoring data);
DEFENDERS HCP DATABASE, supra note 119, at Questions 26, 27, 38 (data indicating only
6% of 274 HCPs approved before 1999 tied monitoring to biological goals, 80% did not
include specific criteria for deciding if adopted mitigation measures are working, and only
10.5% provide a procedure for modifying the level of take or mitigation based on such
criteria); HOOD, supra note 29, at 35 (concluding most of twenty-four HCPs analyzed have
insufficient monitoring); Pederzoli, supra note 107, at 105 (finding a clear monitoring plan
was only proposed in 18 of 30 plans studied).
184
See Thomas, supra note 33, at 113-114 (“[W]e do not know whether the monitoring
programs found to be sufficient were actually implemented.”).
185
See infra Part IV.A.
178
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which they have contractually committed.186 In addition, HCPs regularly
fail to reserve sufficient funding to engage in the adopted monitoring
procedures. The ESA expressly requires adequate funding for all HCP
activities prior to approval of the ITP, which ostensibly includes monitoring
of HCP implementation.187 Though most HCPs appear to at least identify
some funding sources for HCP mitigation activities,188 studies have found
that HCPs often fail to provide sufficient funds to monitor species and
identify problems over the long-term.189
When the Services do actually engage in monitoring, they may use their
substantial enforcement discretion to merely send notices of noncompliance or to suspend or revoke a permit.190 Unfortunately for some
HCPs, the Services simply failed to reserve the power to seek damages or
alterative remedies if the applicant violates the HCP or a related
implementing agreement.191 Unless the HCP itself establishes alternative
enforcement mechanisms, the Services are left with the sole remedy of
permit revocation, an empty threat when (as is usually the case) the most
harmful taking activities occur early in HCP implementation.192
Unsurprisingly, permit revocation is not common.193

186

For example, one Service official is tasked with (among other duties) overseeing
compliance with eleven HCPs in Washington state covering nearly 2.2 million acres. See
Robert McClure & Lisa Stiffler, Too Often, Inadequate Science Hampers Habitat
Planning, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 4, 2005.
187
See 16 U.S.C. 1539(a)(2)(b)(iii) (2000).
188
See KAREIVA ET AL., supra note 150, at 28-29 (finding 98% of the HCPs studied
delineated funding sources for proposed mitigation, but only 77% had significant funds set
aside to pay for mitigation when the HCP was adopted).
189
See DEFENDERS HCP DATABASE, supra note 119, at Question 42 (finding that only
48% of the 274 HCPs analyzed provided the funding for mitigation and other HCP
activities before or at the time the take would occur); id. at 44, 45 (finding that though 22%
of the HCPs analyzed depended on local, state, and/or federal government funding to
implement mitigation, for only 4% was such public funding approved before the ITP was
granted); HOOD, supra note 29, at 82.
190
See STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, supra note 77, at 153-154.
191
See Daniel Hall, Using Habitat Conservation Plans to Implement the Endangered
Species Act in Pacific Coast Forests: Common Problems and Promising Precedents, 27
ENVTL. L. 803, 826 (1997).
192
See Lyons, supra note 47, at 103.
193
See
ECOS
Conservation
Plans
and
Agreements
Database,
http://ecos.fws.gov/conserv_plans/public.jsp (last visited Aug. 14, 2006) (demonstrating
that of over 450 listed HCPs, there is no record of FWS revoking a single ITP). See also
e.g., Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, Fla., 120 F.Supp.2d 1005,
1023-25 (M.D.Fla. 2000) (upholding decision to not revoke permit despite evidence of
repeated applicant noncompliance).
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By spurning systematic monitoring, the Services lack the ability to
verify basic regulatory compliance, a common deficiency in administrative
regulation generally.194 Yet for regulatory processes like HCPs, in which
regulatory decisions are particularly provisional and based on incomplete
information, inadequate monitoring has the additional consequences of
limiting the Services’ ability to understand impacts and can exacerbate risks
to sensitive species and habitat by increasing the difficulty of detecting
potential problems.195 Furthermore, by locating key monitoring functions
with the applicant, the Services have made the temptation for an applicant
to conceal unfavorable information incredibly strong.196 These are precisely
the concerns that collaborative innovations such as the HCP program were
intended to counteract.197
B. Neglecting Adaptive Implementation
Though the Services’ regulations and guidelines provide for the
possibility of adapting HCPs throughout the implementation process, the
experience of the HCP program is that there is a lack of will and incentives
for the Services and permittees to engage in earnest contingency planning or
adaptive management.198 With a few encouraging exceptions, the Services
have largely neglected developing the potential for systematic rigorous
evaluation and adaptation of HCPs.
1. Disincentives to Adaptation
In addition to monitoring, the Services claim to emphasize incorporating
contingency planning and adaptive management procedures in the HCP
implementation process. The Services confirm that usage of contingency
planning—which attempts to manage uncertainty by anticipating
foreseeable circumstances and adopting alternate regulatory strategies as
circumstances change—has been a core objective of the HCP program since
the San Bruno HCP.199 Implementing regulations require contingency
planning for changed circumstances200 if they are foreseeable,201 and make
194

See Freeman, supra note 3, at 16-17.
See Watchman et al., supra note 87, at 5.
196
See, e.g., Rebecca McLain & Robert Lee, Adaptive Management: Promises and
Pitfalls, 20 ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 437, 444 (1996).
197
See Freeman, supra note 3, at 29.
198
See Wilhere, supra note 32, at 21.
199
See id. at 35,248.
200
Changed circumstances are defined as “circumstances that can be reasonably
anticipated.” Id. at 35,253.
201
See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(5), 17.32(b)(5) (2004).
195
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procedures to address unforeseen circumstances a precondition to ITP
issuance.202 The HCP and ITP also must describe the agreed upon range of
management and mitigation strategies and the process by which the
management and funding decisions are made and implemented.203 In sum,
the Services state in their HCP Handbook, “HCP participants should ensure
that techniques used are proven and reliable or, if relatively new, that
contingency measures or adaptive management procedures are included to
correct for failures.”204 These procedures certainly have the potential for
ensuring that new information obtained through monitoring is used as a
feedback loop to adapt an HCP’s original assessments and measures.205
Beyond contingency planning, more recently the Services have provided
for the possibility of more systematic regulatory adaptation during
implementation by introducing to the HCP program a more rigorous,
methodical approach referred to as adaptive management. Adaptive
management was originally proposed by scientists in the 1970s as an
alternative approach to natural resource management in response to the
significant uncertainty that regularly exists in ecosystems.206 As described
by the Services, adaptive management is “a method for examining
alternative strategies for meeting measurable biological goals and
objectives, and then, if necessary, adjusting future conservation
management actions according to what is learned.”207 Proposals to integrate
adaptive management into administrative processes have recently become
fashionable,208 and the Services accommodated the potential for adaptive
management in response to sustained calls for incorporating it into the HCP
program.209
In the context of HCPs, adaptive management focuses on methodically
addressing information gaps in the HCP formation process by including a
202

See id. §§ 17.22(b)(2)(iii), 17.32(b)(2)(iii) (FWS), 50 C.F.R. § 222.307(g) (NMFS)

(2005).
203

See HCP Handbook Addendum, supra note 8, at 35,253.
See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 3-22.
205
Cf. Camacho, supra note 3, at 294; Freeman , supra note 3, at 28..
206
See HCP Handbook Addendum, supra note 8, at 35,252.
207
See id. The Services distinguish between passive and active adaptation: “Passive
adaptation is where information obtained is used to determine a single best course of
action. Active adaptation is developing and testing a range of alternative strategies [citation
omitted]. … [A]n active approach may pose too much of a risk to the species; therefore, a
more passive approach may be the best course of action.” Id.
208
See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act Revised Implementing Procedures, 69
Fed. Reg. 10,866 (Mar. 8, 2004) (making adaptive management an explicit goal of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (2000)).
209
See HCP Handbook Addendum, supra note 8, at 35,245.
204
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systematic procedure for obtaining more data after HCP approval before
choosing between various alternative conservation strategies.210 The focus
of adaptive management in the HCP program, then, is on obtaining further
information before deciding on an ultimate conservation strategy. By
integrating scrupulous evaluation and adjustment of an HCP’s preliminary
conservation strategies to account for a lack of information during the
HCP’s initial formation, adaptive management has the potential for
injecting a much more systematically responsive and effective approach to
regulation.
Under their interpretation of the statute, however, the Services have
created significant disincentives for both the Services and permittees to
either reduce any uncertainty that exists in species conservation disputes or
engage in rigorous adaptive management protocols. First, the HCP program
only requires adaptive management strategies “for HCPs that would
otherwise pose a significant risk to the species at the time the permit is
issued due to significant data or information gaps.”211 In other words,
rather than incorporate systemic adaptive management techniques to make
the regulatory process more responsive based on the most up-to-date
information, the Services only require adaptive management strategies in
HCPs that otherwise would not qualify for an ITP because the risk to the
species of granting the permit is too high.212 Thus, the Services have
essentially dismissed more thorough HCP adaptation except in rare cases.
The Services are frank that, as with their construal of the participation and
monitoring provisions, the limited use of adaptive management strategies

210

As stated by the Services, adaptive management strategies (1) identify uncertainty,
(2) formulate alternative experimental strategies for addressing the uncertainty and
determine which to implement; (3) integrate a monitoring program for detecting the
necessary information for strategy evaluation; and (4) incorporate feedback loops that link
implementation and monitoring to a decision-making process (which may be similar to a
dispute-resolution process) that result in appropriate changes in management. See id. at
35,252.
211
Id. See also id. (“Possible significant data gaps that may require an adaptive
management strategy include, but are not limited to, a significant lack of specific
information about the ecology of the species or its habitat …, uncertainty in the
effectiveness of habitat or species management techniques, or lack of knowledge on the
degree of potential effects of the activity on the species covered in the incidental take
permit.”).
212
See id. at 35,249 (“We believe that an HCP that fails to address significant data
gaps will not meet the issuance criteria of the ESA.”).
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results from their decision to lodge primary discretion over plan design to
applicant-developers.213
Second, although the Services promulgated regulations requiring the
incorporation of contingency planning measures for all foreseeable changed
circumstances, these regulations provide that such circumstances could only
include those specifically delineated in the HCP at the time the HCP was
adopted.214 Even if a foreseeable event occurs, a permittee is only
responsible for subsequent action if new data demonstrates a need for such
mitigation.215 This interpretation produces a strong disincentive for
permittees to engage in research and monitoring “because such an
investment may result in additional costs for future mitigation.” 216
Furthermore, the regulation serves as a strong incentive for the applicant, as
the primary architect of the HCP, to limit the list of foreseeable
circumstances for which contingency measures are necessary.217 By
allowing applicants to strictly limit the participation of other stakeholders in
the HCP formation process, the Services are assigned the full responsibility
of (1) delineating from the outset the potential circumstances that might
warrant integration of contingency planning, and (2) establishing during
implementation that new data demonstrates a need for additional mitigation.
Finally, as for unforeseen circumstances, the Services adopted the
controversial “No Surprises” rule218 to encourage potential applicants to
participate in the HCP program.219 This rule places the financial burden on
the Services if unforeseen circumstances arise during implementation
requiring alterations to the HCP.220 Thus, in addition to providing
applicants the incentive to limit adaptation from the outset, the HCP
program’s regulations potentially furnish the Services with a strong
213

See id. at 35,252 (stating because “stakeholder involvement in the development of
many HCPs, including the adaptive management design, is largely at the discretion of the
applicant,” this can inhibit experimental design and thus the effectiveness of the adaptive
management approach.
214
See id. at 35,253 (“When an HCP [or] permit …. incorporate an adaptive
management strategy, it should clearly state the range of possible operating conservation
program adjustments due to significant new information, risk, or uncertainty. This range
defines the limits of what resource commitments may be required of the permittee.”).
215
See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(5), 17.32(b)(5) (2004).
216
Wilhere, supra note 32, at 27.
217
See Christopher Mills, Note, Incentives and the ESA: Can Conservation Banking
Live Up to Potential?, 14 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL L. & POL’Y J. 523, 532-33 (2004).
218
50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(5), 17.32(b)(5) (2004).
219
See Fred Bosselman, The Statutory and Constitutional Mandate for a No Surprises
Policy, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707 (1997).
220
See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(5), 17.32(b)(5) (2004).
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financial disincentive to engage in adaptation beyond the few circumstances
provided for in the initial HCP.
2. Ignoring Adaptation
Similar to the extent of participation and the monitoring of HCPs, there
is at best limited evidence to date of how often HCPs incorporate adaptive
mechanisms, or whether such measures are used. Yet the evidence that
does exist suggests that, consistent with the implementation framework
developed by the Services, most HCPs do not attempt to use contingency
planning or adaptive management to adjust adopted mitigation or
conservation plan procedures.221
The only comprehensive analysis by scientists, conducted in 1999,
determined that merely one-third (fifteen out of forty-three) of the HCPs
reviewed included “some mechanism for mid-course correction as
additional information was obtained.”222 This evidence cannot be dismissed
on the presumption that HCPs without adaptive measures did not need them
because they relied on sufficient data up-front; plans with insufficient data
were less likely to integrate adaptive or contingent strategies into the HCP’s
provisions than those relying on adequate data.223 Predictably, the few
HCPs that included comprehensive adaptive management protocols
consistently tended to integrate clear and scientifically defensible
monitoring programs.224
Little is known about the extent to which more recently approved HCPs
adopt contingency planning or adaptive management procedures, as neither
the Services nor independent researchers have systematically analyzed more
recently adopted HCPs for inclusion of contingency measures.
Astonishingly, the only recent multi-HCP investigation of adaptation in
221

See DEFENDERS HCP DATABASE, supra note 119, at Question 39, 40 (revealing that
only 22% of the 274 HCPs approved before 1999 explicitly tied monitoring to adaptive
management, and only 35% incorporated adaptive management into the HCP).
222
See Watchman et al., supra note 87, at 7. See also DEFENDERS HCP DATABASE,
supra note 119, at Questions 26, 27, 38 (finding that 80% of the 274 HCPs approved before
1999 failed to include specific criteria for deciding if adopted mitigation measures are
working, and only 10.5% provide a procedure for modifying the level of take or mitigation
based on such criteria).
223
See Watchman et al., supra note 87, at 7; KAREIVA ET AL., supra note 150, at 41
(finding 45% of the thirty-eight cases with insufficient data included a discussion of
adaptive management, while 77% of forty-eight cases with adequate data did so).
224
See KAREIVA ET AL., supra note 150, at 29 (finding 88% of HCPs incorporating
adaptive management protocols had clear monitoring programs, while only 30% of the
HCPs without adaptive management included adequate monitoring procedures).
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HCPs was conducted by a Seattle newspaper, in a series of articles in May
2005, claiming to repeat some of the 1999 study’s analysis but for all large
HCPs approved from 1995 to 2004 not analyzed in the original scientific
study.225 The investigation reported that only 27% (24 of 88) of the HCPs
reviewed included any criteria for determining if mitigation protections are
working, and only 28% (25 of 88) included provisions for modifying the
HCP if mitigation protections fail.226 Furthermore, high-level Service
officials recently acknowledged that insufficient resources are spent on
implementation activities given their importance to the HCP program,227 a
fact that the U.S. General Accounting Office confirmed.228 Although hardly
conclusive, the existing evidence does suggest that the Services do not treat
implementation activities—and adaptation in particular—as a significant
component of the HCP program.
For those HCPs that include provisions for adaptation, no systematic
study has been undertaken assessing whether and to what extent such
provisions actually have been used to adapt HCPs.229 To be sure, there
appear to be a number of positive examples that have successfully
incorporated an implementation program using adaptive management,
including comprehensive monitoring and adaptation procedures.230 Yet,
despite requiring monitoring and providing for the possibility of making

225

See Robert McClure & Lisa Stiffler, Special Report: A License to Kill, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 3, 2005 – May 5, 2005. The report analyzed ninety-eight
HCPs covering plan areas of at least 100 acres, approved from 1995 to 2004, and not
included in KAREIVA ET AL., supra note 150.
226
See McClure & Stiffler, supra note 154.
227
Rick Sayers, head of FWS’s HCP program, recently stated: “Once the permits get
approved, we tend to move quickly on to what’s the next permit that needs to be looked at
and reviewed, rather than spending a lot of time and energy working with the approved
permits making sure everything is going the way it should go.” McClure & Stiffler, supra
note 186. See also id. (quoting former Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt as stating: “That
whole cluster of issues [HCP monitoring and evaluation] didn’t really get the attention it
deserved.… We never got around to it.”)
228
A U.S. General Accounting Office reported that the Services are allocated merely
two million dollars annually for all HCP monitoring and implementation (a small sum
considering there are over 450 HCPs nationwide), and that field staff spend only two
percent of their time on monitoring activities, despite recognition of the importance of
fieldwork and monitoring activities. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-581,
ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM: INFORMATION ON HOW FUNDS ARE ALLOCATED AND
WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE EMPHASIZED 12, 17-18 (2002).
229
See Thomas, supra note 33, at 112, 114.
230
See Marj Nelson, The Changing Face of HCPs, 25 ENDANGERED SPECIES
BULLETIN 4 (July 2000) (describing several HCPs which successfully integrated adaptive
management programs).
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HCPs adaptive, adaptive management and contingency planning are still the
exception rather than the rule in the HCP program.
Because of limited public funding and how the Services have allocated
responsibility, it is hardly surprising that monitoring and adaptation
activities go unattended. Through the Services promulgation of the No
Surprises rule, the HCP program places overwhelming duties on the
Services relative to resources—not only to monitor and make changes to the
conservation program, but also to fund necessary modifications directly.231
Existing evidence suggests this risk has been significant, as most HCPs are
adopted under conditions of substantial uncertainty about the listed species,
ecosystem, proposed take, and efficacy of mitigation232 that may not
become apparent until after the HCP has been approved.233 Indeed, though
not necessarily antithetical to adaptive management,234 because of these
burdens and Service resource limitations, many independent scientists have
repeatedly concluded that the No Surprises regulatory assurances pose
substantial limitations to adaptive management and thus significant risks to
listed species.235 Absent an increase in Service resources or an alteration of
existing incentives for developing a more adjustable framework for
implementing regulatory decisions, the HCP experimental approach to
species and ecosystem conservation will remain largely unsuccessful.
IV. THE MALADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF THE HCP PROGRAM
Perhaps the most problematic deficiency of the Services’ administration
of the HCP program is that the Services have never seriously treated the
experimental regulatory program like an experiment.236 The HCP program
231

See supra notes 218 – 220 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 153 – 161 and accompanying text.
233
See NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, supra note 94, at 24.
234
See J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously: A Case Study of the
Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249, 1280 (2004) (stating No Surprises rule
is essentially a risk allocation measure among private and public sources); John Kostyack,
Reshaping Habitat Conservation Plans for Species Recovery: an Introduction to a Series of
Articles on Habitat Conservation Plans, 27 ENVTL. L. 755, 764 (1997). But see Thomas,
supra note 33, at 125 (recommending repeal of No Surprises rule as antithetical to adaptive
management); John Kostyack, Surprise!, 15 THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 19, 21 (1998);
Parenteau, supra note 108, at 299.
235
See, e.g., NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, supra note 94, at 32-35; Watchman et al.,
supra note 87, at 6-7; K. Shawn Smallwood et al, Using the Best Scientific Data for
Endangered Species Conservation, 24 Environmental Management 421 (1999).
236
See The Endangered Species Act: The Role of Habitat Conservation: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Env’t & Nat. Resources of the Comm. On Merchant Marine &
Fisheries, 103rd Cong. 150 (1993) (statement of Michael Bean, Chairman, Wildlife
Program, Environmental Defense Fund) (“Because HCPs are new, they represent a sort of
232
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was adopted as a novel approach to regulation that significantly departed
from the established command-and-control model.237 The shift was based
on providing a more pragmatic but untested regulatory alternative to
governance that relied on reconciling environmental conservation and
economic development goals by allowing for site-specific, collaborative
negotiation and subsequent plan adaptation during implementation. Though
this program has served as a regulatory vanguard, catalyzing other “ecopragmatic” regulatory programs over the past twenty-five years,238 the
Services have never rigorously examined whether the new approach
actually was more effective at achieving the core conservation, economic or
democratic goals of the experimental program.
A. An Untested and Uncontrolled Experiment
For any regulatory program to be effective, the responsible agency must
collect and respond to information learned about the program during its
implementation, and programs that use adaptive management protocols
certainly are no different.239 Unfortunately, little attention has been given
by the Services to the design of HCP decision-making processes, both at the
program and individual HCP level. The Services appear to prefer a
decentralized, case-by-case approach to structuring HCP processes,
providing only a minimal framework for applicants to follow. This
individualized approach would not necessarily be incongruent with an
evolutionary regulatory structure, as long as (1) structural issues are
required to be addressed when each HCP is developed, and (2) a programwide framework is developed for allowing later negotiation processes to
experiment in new approaches to conservation. Intelligently judging the success or failure
of that experiment will require a significant commitment to monitoring the actual
implementation of approved plans.”).
237
See supra Part I.B.
238
See, e.g., Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (2000);
Environmental Protection Agency’s Project XL, Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot
Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23, 1995). See also Freeman, supra note 3, at 35.
239
See Ruhl, supra note 72, at 936 n.221 (“[A]daptive management, to be effective,
does require institutions that ensure a rigorous framework and implementation policy,
meaning that successful adaptive management requires attention to institutional concerns as
well to the fabric of adaptive management itself. This does not, however, distinguish
adaptive management from any other resource management decision-making approach.”).
See also B.L. Johnson, Introduction to the Special Feature: Adaptive Management Scientifically Sound, Socially Challenged? 3(1) CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 10 (1999),
available at http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss1/art10/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2006)
(“[A]daptive management considers change and cooperation as inherent to
management….To help develop new institutional arrangements, we might apply adaptive
management experiments not just to the resource, but also to institutions themselves.”).
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learn from earlier ones. However, neither of these conditions exists in the
HCP program.
First, other than requiring an application submittal and a minimum
public comment period on the draft application, the Services leave process
design questions regarding data gathering and decision-making open for
applicants to formulate.240 Only rarely do the negotiating parties develop a
structure for the HCP decision process as each HCP is being developed.
One study found that only six percent of the HCPs analyzed included any
discussion and approval of a process framework for information sharing and
decision-making.241 For most HCPs, the parties improvised as the HCP
process progressed.242 This extemporized approach often resulted in
inefficiency in the decision-making process, as confusion and conflict
between stakeholders arose about the process and the various roles of
participants.243
Second and more significantly, the Services have wholly failed to
develop a systematic and coordinated framework for learning about HCP
decision-making processes, making it impossible to evaluate and adapt the
program’s data gathering, participation, monitoring, and adaptation
methods. Although the HCP program is well over two decades old, with
hundreds of HCPs in existence, the Services have not set up a centralized
clearinghouse for gathering and accessing basic HCP documents and
biological data, let alone information about HCP participation, monitoring,
and adaptive management protocols. Despite various appeals for data
gathering on HCPs,244 including a bill proposed in the House of
240

See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 3-6 (“[The Services’] function as agency
representatives is to provide guidance about statutory and policy standards and to help
facilitate development of a suitable mitigation program that satisfies the requirements of
section 10; it is not to dictate every element in the HCP. The option to ignore or modify
Service recommendations remains with the applicant.”).
241
See Ostermeier et al., supra note 113, at 171 (“[I]n the vast majority of HCPs
evaluated, little up-front attention appears to have been given to designing and/or clarifying
HCP management processes. For example, in only two cases did participants indicate
significant early discussion, and subsequent approval, of an overall framework for
establishing and clarifying roles, setting guidelines, sharing assumptions and expectations,
and establishing rules for role implementation, including who would play the roles.”).
242
See id. (“[P]rocess management and a decision framework normally evolved as
cases progressed with a default strategy of ‘deciding as we go.’”).
243
See id. (“In the absence of open clarification, assumptions about roles and who
would play them were made by both service and non-service participants, and problems
often surfaced when these assumptions were inconsistent.”).
244
See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 168, at 9-10 (statement of Peter Kareiva, NMFS)
(calling for a centrally organized and publicly available database on existing HCPs);
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Representatives245 and even draft guidance by the Services,246 still no such
database exists.247 As detailed earlier,248 though a limited number of studies
have been undertaken on the HCP process, these studies have been
piecemeal and conducted by outside researchers, not any of the agencies
with the ability to administer and adjust the program.
Much of what would be helpful—collecting and organizing existing
information on HCPs and making it publicly available—would not be
technologically difficult or expensive.249 Yet the current Presidential
administration has actually been eliminating heavily used databases and
library networks that compile for agency and public use environmental

Jamison Colburn, The Indignity Of Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 57 ALA. L. REV. 417,
453 n.142 (2005).
245
See Endangered Species Recovery Act of 1999, H.R. 960, 106th Cong. (1999). The
bill would have required permittees to submit an annual report (to be made public)
detailing the status of species in the affected area, the HCP and take’s impacts on the
species, and whether biological goals were being met. See id. § 108(a)(2)(D)(i), (ii). The
Secretary of Interior would have had to review and report on the progress of each HCP
every three years through an annual report on the plans reviewed that year. See id.
§ 108(a)(3)(A). The bill also created a “community assistance program” providing a
regional office liaison for property owners and local governments to supply information
and assist compliance with the ESA. See id. § 108(a)(12).
246
See Notice of Availability of a Draft Addendum to the Final Handbook for Habitat
Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,485,
11,488 (March 9, 1999). The proposed guidance required a database “to track incidental
take permit issuance and compliance,” including summary information about each HCP
and suggesting inclusion of information on the monitoring program, reporting deadlines,
the take’s effect, the conservation program’s status, periodic audits and field visits. Id.
247
The bill was dead on arrival, and the final Service guidance erased without
explanation any mention of such a database. See HCP Handbook Addendum, supra note 8;
John Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of the Interior: A Preliminary View, 31
ENVTL. L. 199, 212 (2001).
248
See supra notes 103, 116, 119, 153-155, 157 and accompanying text.
249
See Hearings, supra note 168 at 9 (statement of Peter Kareiva, NMFS) (“There’s a
lot of information out there that we already have, and it’s not as though we have to undergo
a national initiative for great basic research. Part of the challenge is just organizing that
information with a little bit of energy.”); id. at 10 (“[O]ne thing that could be done even
within the existing HCP process is to require HCP preparers to provide data in a publicly
available way…create a data file, put it on the web so that other people could examine the
data for population trends and numbers.”); id. at 27 (statement of Stuart Pimm, Professor,
Univ. of Tenn.) (“[FWS] would seem to be an obvious place to deposit Habitat
Conservation Plans…. [T]his should not be a particularly onerous task. The plans
themselves are documents that can very simply be uploaded onto a website or assembled
onto CDs.”).
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research and technical information that is unavailable anywhere else.250 As
such, even obtaining a copy of an HCP is still quite onerous.251
The FWS did develop an Environmental Conservation Online System
(ECOS),252 which includes a database that serves as the only centralized,
publicly available location for information on HCPs that either of the
Services compiles.253 However, this database is of marginal value at best,
and cannot serve as a valuable learning tool for the HCP regulatory
program. The database only includes the most rudimentary data, such as
plan location, size, application status, permit issuance date, species covered
and duration for individual HCPs.254 Yet even this data is provided only for
each individual HCP separately; the database neither provides any search
engine for examining the limited data nor aggregates data to provide a
programmatic summary.255 Furthermore, only a few HCPs are sporadically
available through the database.256 Other than merely providing the total
250

See, e.g., EPA LIBRARY NETWORK: CHALLENGES FOR FY 2007 AND BEYOND:
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EPA LIBRARY NETWORK WORKGROUP (Nov.
22, 2005), http://www.peer.org/docs/epa/06_9_2_library_network.pdf (last visited Aug. 14,
2006); Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, Bush Axing Libraries While
Pushing For More Research—EPA Set to Close Library Network and Electronic Catalog,
Feb. 10, 2006, http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=643 (last visited Aug. 14,
2006); Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, EPA Closing Its Midwest
Library—Holding Will Be Stored Indefinitely; Public Access to Research Compromised,
March 16, 2006, http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=660 (last visited Aug. 14,
2006).
251
See, e.g., Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (plaintiff forced
to request copies of HCP documents through formal FOIA request); Telephone Interview
by Dan Cory with Robert McClure, Reporter, Seattle Post Intelligencer (July 21, 2006)
(recounting that in attempting to collect almost 100 HCPs, some regional offices required
FOIA request or in-person document review); Thomas, supra note 33, at 122 (“Anyone
who has searched for an HCP … understands the transparency problem. One can purchase
copies …, but this is an expensive and time-consuming proposition.”).
252
See
Environmental
Conservation
Online
System,
http://ecos.fws.gov/ecos_public/index.do (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
253
See
ECOS
Conservation
Plans
and
Agreements
Database,
http://ecos.fws.gov/conserv_plans/public.jsp (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
254
See id.
255
See id.
256
See ECOS Conservation Plans and Agreements Database, Regions 3, 6
http://ecos.fws.gov/conserv_plans/public.jsp (follow the “Region 3” and “Region 6” links)
(last visited Aug. 14, 2006). Regions Three and Six are the only regional offices providing
any significant amount of HCP-related documents for download through the ECOS system,
providing documents for three and nineteen HCPs, respectively. See id. Region Two also
supplies its own web library that includes some HCP-related documents. See FWS
Southwest
Region
(Region
2)
Ecological
Services
Electronic
Library,
http://www.fws.gov/ifw2es/Library/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
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number of HCPs and ITPs issued to date, this database does not compile
and provide any systematic information about the HCP program itself.257
Because of concerns regarding the Services’ failure to develop a useful
comprehensive database on HCPs, some private organizations have
endeavored to develop a private resource pool “to enable independent
scientific expertise to be brought into HCP negotiations on behalf of
conservation interests and local communities.”258 Unfortunately, this
initiative to create an “HCP Resource Center” never became operational,
though seed money had been gathered and some Service field staff
expressed support for such a center.259 High-level Service officials
ultimately resisted this independent effort, claiming it was unnecessary and
unwise, and proponents were unable to collect sufficient funds to establish
the database.260 Thus, when biological data on species or habitat is gathered
during the HCP formation or implementation processes, it is generally not
readily accessible by interested parties for subsequent HCP applications.261
The essential information that the Services have failed to collect,
circulate and evaluate is by no means limited to substantive data about
regulated species and ecosystems, however. More importantly, the Services
have never attempted to gather data about the range of procedural strategies
utilized under the HCP program—monitoring, adaptive management, or
participation techniques—to adjust the program to account for the results.
For example, the Services could but do not systematically assess the relative
effectiveness of adopted mitigation and recovery measures in minimizing a
take’s effect on an existing species. The Services have also never
systematically compiled data about the costs and benefits of monitoring and
adaptation procedures as compared to other adopted adaptive practices and
more conventional implementation procedures. Nor have they assessed the
relative efficacy of different adaptive processes in distinct implementation
257

See ECOS Conservation Plans and Agreements Database, Regional Report,
http://ecos.fws.gov/conserv_plans/servlet/gov.doi.hcp.servlets.PlanReportSelect?region=9
&type=HCP (follow “Regional (Summary) Report” link) (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
258
NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, supra note 94, at 23.
259
See Telephone Interview with Greg Thomas, President, Natural Heritage Institute
(June 27, 2006).
260
See id. The Nature Conservancy has created NatureServe.org, a publicly available
electronic database that serves as a repository of scientific data about endangered and
threatened species. See http://www.natureserve.org (last visited Aug. 14, 2006). However,
no information focusing on HCPs or the HCP program itself are included in the database.
261
See Thomas, supra note 33, at 115 (“[N]either the FWS nor the Department of
Interior have developed a public HCP library, let alone a transparent monitoring program
through which centralized actors and citizens can learn whether and to what degree HCPs
are being implemented.”).
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contexts, most obviously to evaluate the value of different forms of
adaptation in circumstances with varying levels of certainty.262
In the same way, the Services do not observe and evaluate the effect and
effectiveness of various types of participation used in HCP processes.
These may range from transparency measures (e.g., open negotiations,
document access), to indirect participation by stakeholders (e.g.,
opportunities to comment, receive responses to such comments), to direct
stakeholder involvement (e.g., steering committees). The Services have
never explored the value of these participation alternatives for different
types of HCPs, based on the number and range of interested stakeholders,
the type of species or habitat involved, the form of proposed take, the type
of applicant (public versus private), or the novelty of the proposed take
being considered. Finally, the Services have not assessed the value of these
different forms of participation in the various stages of the regulatory
process, whether the initial scoping of issues and alternatives, developing
the process framework, plan negotiations, post-negotiation comment period,
or during implementation.
The Services simply speculate that participation is generally valuable,
but leave questions regarding the forms of participation for a particular HCP
process to individual applicants to develop without providing any rigorous
data about the value of different types of participation in different contexts.
Thus, in the rare circumstance when an applicant is motivated to integrate
other parties into the regulatory process, her at best limited experience with
HCPs undoubtedly leads to a less cost effective process than one informed
by the aggregated experiences of hundreds of previously adopted HCPs.263

262

For example, it might be reasonable for an HCP to adopt a contingency planning
measure instead of a more comprehensive adaptive management protocol on the
assumption that it is more effective when the HCP relies on substantial reliable information
about the effect of a proposed take on a listed species. Yet, without monitoring and
assessing the effectiveness of the adopted process as compared to those adopted for other
HCPs program-wide, such an assumption is never tested, and the Services and public can
never learn if the assumption is a valid one.
263
Generally, each applicant must rely primarily on its own experiences, with at best
incomplete access to data on what practices might be most cost effective to implement. As
in other regulatory contexts, an HCP process may involve a repeat player such as an
attorney representing successive applicants in negotiating HCPs. Such a participant may
inform the HCP process with her experience (e.g., by relying on language from previously
negotiated HCPs when drafting later ones). Though this experience may serve to make the
process somewhat more economical, it inevitably falls far short of a more systematic,
comprehensive approach to regulatory learning.
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Given this inefficiency, it is unsurprising that the chief criticism of HCPs is
the administrative cost of the approval process.264
To be sure, Service staff assigned to negotiate an HCP in all likelihood
rely on some previously ascertained data, and they may informally provide
such information to applicants in the negotiation process. However, there is
no comprehensive network to facilitate the dissemination of this
information in other than a haphazard, and likely inefficient, way. HCP
negotiation and implementation are conducted by regional and field offices
without any centralized or even decentralized coordination.265 Moreover,
the high turnover of Service staff exacerbates this fragmentation problem by
further limiting the ability to draw on prior experience.266 As such, there is
at best limited cross-pollination of data among HCPs about affected species
and habitat, and certainly less than could occur.267
Similarly, the Services have undeniably modified the HCP program
requirements since the program’s inception in 1982—most notably through
the promulgation of the Addendum to the HCP Handbook268 and the “No
Surprises” policy269—presumably to tailor the program to be more
effective. Thus, in some sense, they have engaged in some form of
reflection and adaptation of the program, perhaps to account for information
acquired during the program’s implementation. However, the Services
never provided any systematic evaluation of the HCP program in support of
such programmatic changes. Though the Services may have relied at least
in part on the experiences of some Service officials in determining that the
regulatory changes adopted were warranted, Service conclusions about the
264

See, e.g., Bean et al., supra note 46, at 13 (“[T]he complexity, duration, and sheer
magnitude of the process often limit participation by small landowners, environmental
interests, and other “shallow-pocketed” parties. Indeed, the inability of such parties to
participate in the time-consuming, highly technical, and costly process may be more of a
problem than having so many of them as to make the process difficult to manage.”); .Albert
Lin, Participants’ Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for
Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOL. L. Q. 369, 398 (1996) (finding insufficient information
as most frequent cause of delay).
265
See Karkkainen, supra note 176, at 496 (“[R]esponsibility for negotiating HCPs and
enforcing their terms was a responsibility assigned to regional and field offices, each
operating largely by its own lights.”).
266
The FWS has reported substantial staff attrition due to the overwhelming workloads
that result from insufficient funding. See Hearings, supra, note 168 at 119, 387 (statement
of then-FWS Director Jaime Rappaport Clark).
267
See Hearings, supra note 168, at 11 (statement of Dr. Dennis Murphy, Univ. of
Nev., Reno) (“My sense is that we can infer greatly from other systems and other species
and we’re losing that opportunity.”).
268
HCP Handbook Addendum, supra note 8, at 35,242.
269
50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(5), 17.32(b)(5) (2004).
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program’s effectiveness were essentially based on anecdotal evidence rather
than a rigorous analysis rooted in a commitment to regulatory
experimentation.
B. The Value of Adaptive Regulation
Though increasing participation and adapting individual HCPs without
program adaptation would likely still serve to improve the HCP program,
adaptively managing the program itself is necessary to better understand the
regulatory process and work toward obtaining an optimal regulatory
program. Substantial evidence from the HCP program suggests that by
requiring the involvement of a range of perspectives rather than solely the
applicant’s, the Services can develop HCPs based on better data than under
existing bilateral requirements, more effectively combat concerns regarding
agency capture, and foster a more cooperative and perhaps even more cost
effective approach to regulation.270 Similarly, by monitoring biological data
about species, habitat, and mitigation for an individual HCP, the Services
can both improve compliance and enforcement and better tailor
conservation activities to be more effective.
However, only by gathering information about the HCP program itself
can the Services, Congress and the public better understand and evaluate the
regulatory process. By experimenting with and persistently monitoring the
range of participation types used, the Services can better understand the
value of participation, and explore what would be the optimal participation
approach for a particular context. By examining information about the HCP
program’s use of monitoring and adaptation protocols, the Services can
better understand the value of different implementation approaches.
Through adaptive regulatory management, fundamental questions that are
incapable of answer at the outset—how much participation is optimal, what
type of monitoring protocol should be used—can begin to be resolved.
More significantly, rather than the conventional approach of neglecting
periodic assessment of regulation, an adaptive regulatory approach requires
the repeated consideration of the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of the
regulatory program in meeting statutory goals. Adaptive regulatory
management allows the agency, Congress and the public to judge regulatory
outcomes—to consider the critical, but heretofore unanswered, questions of
what is the most effective way to appropriately balance the development
and conservation goals of the HCP program. With a public, comprehensive
information apparatus, all regulatory actors can compare the relative merits
270

See supra notes 141 – 149 and accompanying text.
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of adopted HCPs in balancing economic development and environmental
conservation—to learn to tailor the optimal reconciliation of these
principles in a comprehensive, open, and informed way.271
Finally, it should be noted that by requiring the Service to monitor and
adapt the regulatory process itself, adaptive regulatory management allows
the Service’s implementation of the HCP program to itself be monitored
and evaluated by both Congress and the public at large.272 This is necessary
not only in order to develop HCPs that are better able to meet program
goals, but also to promote accountability and limit the vulnerability of
participatory decision-making processes to capture. As raised by some
scholars, adaptive processes are certainly vulnerable to capture, and in fact
may be more so than conventional “front-end” static approaches because
there are simply more opportunities available to privileged participants to
affect decisions.273 The potential for agency bias, however, is certainly not
a product of an adaptive regulatory approach; rather, providing for
adaptation merely brings to the surface the vulnerability to bias that already
exists for any regulatory decision for which participation is a feature.274
Indeed, the experience of the HCP program is that the existing bilateral
model that the Services have employed in implementing the HCP program
makes agency bias almost inevitable. A key role of transparency and
inclusive stakeholder participation in the regulatory process, then, is to
alleviate legitimate concerns regarding agency bias by placing a mechanism
for agency accountability in the hands of those most affected by the
regulatory decision.275 By requiring the Services’ implementation of the
HCP program to be subject to ongoing monitoring and evaluation, not only
271

It is important to recognize that regulatory adaptation does not merely serve to
increase conservation and participation at all costs. The Services’ regulatory program must
be adaptively managed to ensure that it is not needlessly costly as well. An adaptive
approach considers the benefits and costs of regulatory processes, including the
administrative costs of implementing more costly participatory or adaptive requirements.
In doing so, an adaptive HCP program would focus on how to optimize the effectiveness
and cost effectiveness of participation and adaptation in promoting conservation, economic
and democratic goals.
272
See Ruhl, supra note 234, at 1278 (“[T]he agency’s use of adaptive management
itself must be continuously monitored and evaluated to guard against opportunistic
abuses.”).
273
See Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Institutional Challenges of "New Age" Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50,
71-74; Ruhl, supra note 234, at 1278.
274
See Ruhl, supra note 234, at 1278 (“’front end’ regulatory instruments… can be
manipulated just as easily [as adaptive management processes] to open the possibility of
politically-motivated implementation.”).
275
See J.B. Ruhl, Prescribing the Right Dose of Peer Review for the Endangered
Species Act, 83 NEB. L. REV. 398, 411-12 (2004).
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by Congress but the public at large, adaptive management of the regulatory
program serves to curb opportunities for bias that otherwise are present
through the existing opaque and bilateral HCP negotiation process.
V. ADAPTING REGULATION: THE LESSONS FROM THE HCP PROGRAM
As it consistently has on regular intervals,276 the United States Congress
is once again considering a number of substantial amendments that seek to
adapt, if not overhaul, the Endangered Species Act.277 As was the case for
most previous proposals to amend the Act,278 it is quite possible that
ultimately no amendment will be adopted in the near future.279 However,
though certainly how the Act should be altered is very much still a subject
of debate in Congressional circles,280 there appears to be a level of
consensus among informed observers that modifying the Act in some
substantial way would be beneficial.281 Many from all sides of the debate
concur that the ESA’s emphasis on preventing development rather than
focusing on recovery is misplaced and ineffective,282 pointing out that both
listed species and candidates to be listed continue to deteriorate.283

276

See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225
(1978); Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1426
(1982); Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. 100-478, 102 Stat. 2315
(1988).
277
See, e.g., Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005, H.R. 3824,
th
109 Cong. (2005); Collaboration and Recovery of Endangered Species Act, S. 2110, 109th
Cong. (2005); Critical Habitat Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 1299, 109th Cong. (2005);
Endangered Species Compliance and Transparency Act of 2006, H.R. 4857, 109th Cong.
(2006).
278
See, e.g., Endangered Species Conservation and Management Act of 1995, H.R.
2275, 104th Cong. (1995); Common Sense Protections for Endangered Species Act of 2000,
H.R. 3160, 106th Cong. (2000); Sound Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of
2002, H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. (2002).
279
See Freeman & Berman, supra note 5.
280
See KEYSTONE CENTER, THE KEYSTONE WORKING GROUP ON ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT HABITAT ISSUES - FINAL REPORT 16 (2006). See also Allison A. Freeman,
supra note 5 (quoting Senators involved in committee ESA amendment negotiations as
saying that they were deadlocked due to disagreement on issues of funding, critical habitat,
and the jeopardy standard, among others).
281
See id. at 13-15; Steven Burns & Jeffrey Wood, Moving Toward Recovery: A
Southeastern Analysis of the Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005
(H.R. 3824), 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 23, 49-50 (2006).
282
See Colburn, supra note 244, at 444; Burns & Wood, supra note 281, at 25, 30;
John Kostyack, Reshaping Habitat Conservation Plans for Species Recovery: An
Introduction To a Series of Articles on Habitat Conservation Plans, 27 ENVTL. L. 755, 760
(1997).
283
As of the FWS’s most recent report to Congress, a majority of listed species (sixty-
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Recognizing the past limitations of the original ESA’s command-andcontrol framework, a wide array of scholars involved in the most recent
ESA amendment discussions agree on the need to focus not only on
legislative mandates but also adjusting the incentives for developers to
participate in the governance process.284 However, existing Congressional
proposals almost exclusively concentrate on ways to improve the outputs of
the regulatory process, such as through direct subsidies to applicantdevelopers to engage in species recovery,285 ignoring the fundamental
limitations of the existing regulatory process itself. Over the past quartercentury, the Services’ implementation of the pioneering but rudderless HCP
program has exposed three basic flaws that serve as valuable lessons for
formulating not only an improved ESA, but regulatory processes more
generally. As detailed in this Part, in designing and adapting any regulatory
program, Congress must recognize that only by attending to agency
resources, legislative directives, and applicant incentives can an adaptive
regulatory program have a chance to succeed.
A. Resources: Making Evolution Possible
A straightforward but nonetheless vital lesson of the Services
implementation of the HCP program is that without sufficient resources
directed toward information gathering, monitoring and adaptation, a
regulatory agency will not be able to implement adaptive regulatory
management. For any regulatory program to be successful, Congress must
appropriate sufficient funding to engage in the required administrative
functions.286 Given the persistent weak financial support provided to the
Services to engage in habitat conservation as compared to their workload,287
three percent) are considered to be of uncertain or declining status or are possibly extinct.
See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RECOVERY REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEARS 20012002 10 (2002)
284
See KEYSTONE CENTER, supra note 280, at 19-23; Threatened and Endangered
Species Recovery Act of 2005, § 13, H.R. 3824, 109th Cong. (2005); Incentives for Species
Recovery Act, S. 2110 tit. III, 109th Cong. (2005).
285
See Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005, H.R. 3824, 109th
Cong. § 13 (2005).
286
See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 168, at 119 (statement of Dr. Donald Barry,
Assistant Sec’y of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks) (“Without increased funding, we will not be
able to adequately monitor HCPs to the extent desired by both supporters and critics of the
HCP program.”)
287
See Thomas, supra note 33, at 112, 115. Though not incontrovertible, it is telling
that in a 2005 survey, 92% of 414 FWS scientists reported that they did not believe the
agency “has sufficient resources to adequately perform its environmental mission,” and
85% reported funding to implement the ESA is inadequate. See Union of Concerned
Scientists & Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, U.S. Fish & Wildlife
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and in particular implementation activities,288 it is perhaps not surprising
then that the Services neglect those activities they view as less celebrated
and more resource intensive in the short-term, such as managing
stakeholder participation and enforcement and implementation of HCPs.289
Indeed, in a 1998 survey, 95% of FWS enforcement agents reported that the
FWS law enforcement program is insufficiently staffed to fulfill its wildlife
protection mission, and 99% reported that enforcement expenditures and
staffing have failed to keep pace with the growth in other FWS programs.290
Surely, Service officials could more effectively engage in their mediative
and oversight activities if additional funding were provided. Such funding
is necessary for direct resource management and recovery activities by the
Services as well,291 particularly for addressing unforeseen circumstances
where the permittee is not required to engage in adaptive management.292
Although existing funding for Service program management is
undoubtedly inadequate, it is nonetheless short-sighted to assume
reflexively (as the Services appear to do)293 that providing early
Service
Survey
Summary,
February
2005,
available
at
http://www.peer.org/pubs/surveys/2005_fws_survey.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
Similarly, 81% of 124 NMFS scientists responded that NMFS lacked sufficient resources
“to adequately perform its environmental mission.” See Union of Concerned Scientists &
Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, NOAA Fisheries Survey Summary,
June 2005, available at http://www.peer.org/pubs/surveys/2005_noaa_survey.pdf (last
visited Aug. 14, 2006).
288
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
289
See Land and Money Mitigation Requirements in Endangered Species Act
Enforcement: Hearing Before the Comm. On Resources, 106th Cong. 102 (1999) (statement
of then-director of FWS Jamie Rappaport Clark) (“We don’t, quite frankly, have the
resources to go back and evaluate whether the terms of these HCPs that have
been…negotiated and approved, are actually being carried out.”); YAFFEE ET AL.,
APPENDIX A-Weyerhaeuser-10 (quoting FWS biologist as stating most HCP staff recognize
the irritations and difficulties of participation but disregard its usefulness).
290
See Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, 1998 PEER Survey of
FWS
Special
Agents,
Questions
2,
3,
available
at
http://www.peer.org/pubs/surveys/1998_usfws_lawenforcement.pdf (last visited Aug. 7,
2006).
291
See Hearings, supra, note 168 at 23 (statement of Dr. Dennis Murphy, University
of Nevada, Reno) (“[W]e’re never going to get (to recovery) if we have to go through an
appropriations process to respond to crises; that we really do need a pool of money, an
endowment of sorts that can be tapped, hopefully conservatively, to resolve problems.”).
292
See NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, supra note 94, at 29 (suggesting federal trust
for funding conservation activities beyond those required of applicants to meet biological
goals).
293
See, e.g. YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 103, at 5-15 (“USFWS staff strongly felt that
public participation increased the cost and length of HCPs.”); HCP Handbook Addendum,
supra note 8, at 35,252.

DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE, QUOTE OR REPRODUCE

52

MAKING REGULATION EVOLVE

[14-Aug-06

participation and adaptation necessarily is substantially more resource
intensive than the HCP program’s existing bilateral and static approach.
Though adaptive management initially may be more resource intensive
given the lack of an existing framework, as the adaptive apparatus develops
and HCP information is disseminated, even the Services appear to agree
that costs will decrease as new HCPs rely on the data of earlier ones.294
Similarly, though not extensively tested in the HCP program’s context,
there is at least some evidence that litigation costs are reduced and permit
implementation is more likely to be trouble-free in contexts where there are
more rigorous and early opportunities for participation.295 These decreased
costs serve at least to offset in part any administrative costs of increasing
early participation in the regulatory process.
More importantly, any increased administrative costs must be
considered in light of the substantive benefits of such activities. These
include improved HCPs based on more reliable information and more
democratic processes viewed as more satisfactory to stakeholders.296 Thus,
though increasing the Services’ budget would enhance the Service’s ability
to engage in HCP program management, even with limited funds Service
efforts to increase adaptation and participation may not significantly
increase administrative costs, and in any event may be worthwhile given the
inadequate information upon which most HCPs are based.
294

See Hearings, supra, note 168 at 97 (statement of Hon. Donald J. Barry, Assistant
Sec’y for Fish, Wildlife and Parks) (“(We should) be able to develop more of a template
HCP that could be utilized readily, pulled off the shelf in a particular area for certain
species, and use that as a way of streamlining the cost and the process.”). See also id. at 10
(statement of Peter Kareiva, NMFS) (“[I]f we did produce data bases, if we put energy into
that, subsequent efforts would go much faster…. Any data that you put in a computer data
base for any of those HCPs will inform future conservation plans that touch on those same
species.”); Wilhere, supra note 32, at 27 (“The information obtained from one HCP can be
applied to future HCPs and other conservation programs. The amount of research and
monitoring needed by future HCPs could be reduced and the efficiency of conservation
measures could be increased.”).
295
See supra notes 143 – 145 and accompanying text. Cf. Jody Freeman, Extending
Public Law Norms through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1339 (2003)
(discussing public laws and the ways in which increased public participation, though
potentially more costly up front, can reduce overall costs by minimizing future conflicts
among the affected parties); Camacho, supra note 3, at 307-09 (summarizing empirical
data suggesting that implementing additional collaborative procedures in environmental
and land use regulation may decrease administrative costs in the long run).
296
See supra note 144 and accompanying text; Wilhere, supra note 32, at 22 (“The
costs of research and monitoring make adaptive management seem relatively expensive.
But if all costs are considered, then adaptive management may be relatively inexpensive
over the long run. In theory, investments in reliable information should yield excellent
returns in the sustainable use of natural resources.”).
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B. Legislative Directives: Making Evolution Plausible
Though sufficient funding for the Services to perform their statutory
mandate is necessary, the availability of resources alone does not increase
the plausibility that the Services will attempt to cultivate transparent
information gathering, meaningful participation and adaptive
management.297 A second key lesson from the HCP program is that without
legislative guidance mandating participation and an adaptive
experimentalist framework, administrative officials will not scrupulously
foster participation or engage in regulatory adaptation. Whether due to
regulatory capture, an over-reliance on agency expertise manifested as a
disregard for the value of participation, or simply a reticence toward
learning and change, Service interpretation and implementation of the HCP
program quickly stifled the potential for adaptive regulation.
As such, the statute itself must provide a framework for regulatory
experimentalism that mandates early and meaningful opportunities for
participation and a framework for HCP adaptation. In this vein, Congress
should amend the HCP program to require the Service to provide for
stakeholder involvement in HCP formation, implementation and
enforcement for an applicant to avail itself of the ITP exception. Drawing
on the most common method used voluntarily by applicants to obtain
stakeholder input in the existing HCP program, at the outset the default
avenue for participation should be a steering committee of interested
stakeholders298 with independent scientists to review the applicant’s
submitted biological data.299 The committee would help the applicant and
Services develop the plan, monitor performance, and adjust HCP activities.
Short of requiring all HCPs to form a steering committee, the program
could provide an alternative multilateral process to the existing bilateral
approach that subjects an applicant to streamlined administrative review and

297

Cf. Freeman, supra note 3, at 17 (stating Environmental Protection Agency’s failure
to adequately address its enforcement responsibilities is a product not only of inadequate
resources but also institutional incentives).
298
See Doremus, supra note 102, at 716.
299
See Watchman et al., supra note 87, at 5-6 (“A … precautionary approach would be
to build more independent scientific review into the HCP development process. Teams of
qualified scientists could be assembled to review topics such as data gaps for species
commonly addressed by HCPs or the evidence of the efficacy of specific management and
mitigation techniques. Such scientific reviews could reduce uncertainty for both
landowners and imperiled species by vastly improving the information available for future
plans.”); Hearings, supra, note 168 at 213 (statement of Gregory Thomas, Natural Heritage
Institute).
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more deferential judicial review if the applicant uses a steering
committee.300
It is important to note that providing interested stakeholders additional
early opportunities for input is not inevitably an unmanageable endeavor.
The Services certainly could require, subject to judicial review, a
demonstrated good faith willingness and capacity to contribute to HCP
formation or implementation before inclusion in a steering committee.301
As already occurs for a few HCPs, the Services or applicant can provide
key under-resourced302 community groups that qualify as stakeholders
financial support to assist them in participation.303 Regardless of whether
steering committees are required for all HCPs or not, those precluded from
direct participation should nonetheless be allowed to observe key HCP
negotiations and examine any principal drafted documents used during
negotiations or developed during implementation.
To address the Services heretofore indifference to adaptation, Congress
should insist on systematic periodic assessment and adaptation304 by making
HCP approval contingent on inclusion of monitoring and biological criteria
to account for new information and evolving environmental circumstances
that trigger mitigation modification if not met. Legislative directives should
also tap private resources to assist in the implementation process. For
example, the Services should require publication of monitoring reports.305
This builds in an incentive for the Services and applicant to reliably oversee
HCP implementation by providing the public the ability to check whether
the applicant and Services are both monitoring compliance and in
300

Cf. Harter, supra note 3, at 103 (1982) (suggesting a negotiated rule should be
“sustained to the extent that it is within the agency’s jurisdiction and actually reflects a
consensus among the interested parties.”); Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The
Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. REG. 133, 164 (1985); Patricia
M. Wald, ADR and the Courts: An Update, 46 DUKE L.J. 1445, 1468 (1997).
301
See NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, supra note 94, at 19 (“Demonstrated ability to
contribute substantively to the issues on the table without undue delay may be made the
price of admission.”).
302
See, e.g., YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 103, at A-Riverside-9 (quoting local official
stating, “You might have very few environmental people and a preponderance of property
owners and Building Industry Association and Farm Bureau folks. And that…was because
the environmental groups were all volunteers; it was very difficult for them to attend the
monthly meetings.”).
303
See id. at 5-2 (finding for six of thirty-five HCPs, applicant or FWS “provided
citizens with financial support to participate.”).
304
See Watchman et al., supra note 87, at 7 (“[U]ncertainty could be further minimized
by providing greater opportunities to adjust plans during implementation in response to
new information or changing environmental conditions.”).
305
See Thomas, supra note 33, at 125.
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compliance. In addition, stakeholder participation in implementation may
include sequential steering committee review or providing in the HCP for
third-party enforcement of HCP provisions.306
Of course, as the Services learn about the relative value of particular
participation, monitoring and adaptation techniques by adaptively managing
the HCP program, the particular parameters of new HCPs undoubtedly can
be tailored to address distinctive characteristics. In this vein, Congress
should mandate the development of a comprehensive framework for
regulatory learning. As its core component, this framework would include a
publicly accessible information clearinghouse, gathering and circulating on
biological data as well as information on individual HCP negotiations and
implementation activities. Finally, required publication of periodic reports
assessing the program’s progress would serve not only to promote Service
adaptation of the regulatory program but foster accountability to Congress
and the public in the endeavor.
In adopting a more multilateral regulatory approach, the Services rather
than the applicant are rightly established as the hub of the regulatory
process,307 not merely a negotiating counterweight to applicants. The
Services are charged with ascertaining who may participate; gathering,
managing and assessing data; mediating any conflicting data or
perspectives; and making the required statutory findings. Undoubtedly,
there will be challenges in integrating the range of interested parties,
deciding who to allow direct participation, assembling data, and overseeing
episodic HCP adjustment. However, the Services certainly are the
regulatory actors best placed to make such hard but not insurmountable
decisions—certainly better than the applicant, with whom such functions
currently rest—and no evidence exists that the existing bilateral approach
would somehow be more effective.308
Placing the Services in this more mediative role instead of as bilateral
negotiator addresses the various weaknesses of the bilateral model revealed
306

See YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 103, at 5-2. Cf. Sean Ociepka, Casenote, Protecting
the Public Benefit: Crafting Precedent for Citizen Enforcement of Conservation
Easements, 58 ME. L. REV. 225 (2006) (discussing recent judicial recognition of citizen
enforcement of conservation easements notwithstanding unclear easement and statutory
provisions and limited precedent).
307
See NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, supra note 94, at 20, 37 (2000).
308
Cf. YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 103, at APPENDIX A-CLARK COUNTY–9 (quoting
local HCP administrator as stating: “Keeping it totally open and inclusive has the typical
downsides: people get irritated, it takes forever, and costs more—but there is no other
way.”).
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by the HCP program. First, by doing so the Services are considerably less
dependent on the applicant for information on the proposed take’s potential
impacts or the possible mitigation and recovery alternatives,309 reducing the
likelihood of capture. A robust participatory process serves as the only
check on an otherwise insulated agency decision-making process.310
Second, requiring the Services to provide opportunities for participation
shifts the responsibility and burden for implementation to private actors
who already have the incentive to monitor applicant compliance. Involving
interested stakeholders in monitoring can serve as an effective resource for
ensuring compliance with the HCP without substantial new costs levied on
the Services. Indeed, despite the limited access that non-applicant
stakeholders have in HCP processes, even now Service officials state that
third parties are their largest information source on HCP non-compliance.311
By providing third parties access to negotiations and implementation, the
HCP program can more systematically harness available private resources
to further the program’s public goals.312
Third and most importantly, ultimately the Services’ can more
effectively fulfill the role of mediator in marshalling data and resolving
disputes between applicants and other stakeholders than serving as an
isolated negotiator and monitor of HCP activities. To be sure, by relying on
the scientific expertise of Service biologists, the Services may be able to
gather and assess biological data and forecasts about a species or a proposed
take’s environmental impacts, alternatives and mitigation without engaging
any of the stakeholders (including the applicant).313 However, though some
scientific data may be collectible and assessable without any input from
those affected by the decision, many of the ultimate issues addressed by the
309

See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 13 (finding public participation increased
the information available to develop HCPs).
310
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3, at 288 (stating participation in evaluating
regulatory provisions can serve to increase the accountability of regulatory agencies).
311
See McClure & Stiffler, supra note 186 (quoting Bob Pine, Austin FWS habitat
conservation director) (“Our biggest source of information is third party input–people
writing letters saying someone didn’t get a permit or take an action.”). This official
acknowledged that his regional department rarely does its own inspecting. See id.
312
Cf. Freeman, supra note 1, at 663.
313
Even so, it is not at all clear that such an approach is the most effective, or even an
effective, method for gathering and assessing scientific data. Certainly, a model that relies
on the input of those most affected by the particular decision, as well as the input of
independent scientists, at least may allow for consideration of more data than that
developed by the Services alone, or might gather similar data more cost effectively.
Indeed, existing evidence suggests that participation provides valuable information to the
Services in developing HCPs. See supra notes 142, 148 – 149 and accompanying text.
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Services in developing an HCP are not. Though the Services may rely on
scientific expertise in ascertaining the likely impacts of a proposed take, a
number of the Services’ required analyses are not knowable solely by
reference to the Services’ biological expertise.314 For example, the proposal
and assessment of alternatives to the proposed take require the compilation
of not only scientific data but also information about economic and social
objectives and preferences from those affected by the regulatory decision.315
Similarly, several of the ultimate findings required for Service approval
of an ITP require an assessment that balances economic and environmental
values. For instance, whether the HCP mitigates impacts to a species or
habitat “to the maximum extent practicable”316 is at least in part an
assessment of the economic impact of potential mitigation on the applicant
that requires a judgment call involving economic considerations on whether
particular mitigation is indeed feasible. Far from claiming an expertise in
analyzing economic feasibility, the Services largely ignore this area for data
gathering.317 In the same way, whether the applicant provides “adequate
funding”318 for implementation of the HCP is an economic assessment.
Even the finding of whether a take “will not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species” 319 involves a
judgment as to whether a species’ reduction is indeed “appreciable,” a
determination for which no consensus scientific criteria has been
developed.320 In short, the resource allocation questions embodied in an
HCP ultimately turn on public policy choices that require information about
314

See Hearings, supra note 168, at 296 (statement of Don Rose, Manager, Land
Planning and Natural Resources, Sempra Energy) (“About 90 to 95 percent … of the
professionals in the wildlife agency, the service, are biologists. They do not have the other
disciplines necessary, in my opinion, to carry out what is needed for a comprehensive
HCP.”); Steven Yaffee, PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT 162 (1982) (“While science can and should inform choice, rarely can it do so
definitively. Most policy choices involve fundamental choices of social value – issues for
which technicians have only one voice among many. The central issues of the endangered
species case – determining what is ethical behavior and what is valuable to protect at what
cost – require individual and group assessments of what is moral and what is valued.
Economics and biology can only help us slightly in making those choices.”).
315
See, e.g., HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 3-35; Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d.
173, 184-86 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that Service and not just developer must determine
that alternatives proposed are impracticable based on economic and other considerations).
316
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2000).
317
See Wilhere, supra note 32, at 23 (stating Services do not require applicants to
provide financial data on draft HCPs for Services to make “maximum extent practicable”
finding).
318
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2000).
319
Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv).
320
See Wilhere, supra note 32, at 26.
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the preferences of those affected by the decision. As demonstrated by the
HCP program experiment, only through legislatively refashioning the
Services’ role from negotiator to mediator can Congress make the adaptive
regulatory approach plausible.
C. Incentives for Applicants: Making Evolution Probable
Finally, the HCP program experiment has demonstrated that even
mandates for procedures that foster adaptation—such as the HCP program’s
monitoring requirements—are far from guarantees of successful regulatory
adaptation. Furthermore, though the Services’ No Surprises rule provided
the impetus for many applicants to participate in the HCP program, it also
created significant further incentives for applicants to thwart monitoring and
adaptive management.321 The experience of the HCP program is that
providing incentives for applicants to actively assist in the governance
process and contribute to information generation is critical to cultivating a
truly adaptive and participatory regulatory program.322
Just as the agency should share responsibility to further regulatory goals
with third parties consistent with their stake and abilities,323 it is particularly
imperative to enlist the applicant to bear a portion of the costs of its
activities by contributing to the furtherance of public goals. As the entity
typically with the most direct access to information about regulated species
and habitat, applicants are usually the regulatory actors best placed to
engage in information collection about HCP activities.324 As the entity
usually with the most direct involvement in ongoing HCP activities that
may affect species and habitat, the applicant is also the most essential party
to enlist in adaptive management protocols during HCP implementation.325
While the No Surprises rule shows that exclusively focusing on developer
incentives can undermine efforts to address other statutory goals,326
321

See supra notes 218 – 220 and 233 – 235 and accompanying text.
See Doremus, supra note 273, at 71-72 (“Providing appropriate incentives for the
generation and disclosure of information … is critical to the effective protection of
endangered species on private land.”).
323
See Lobel, supra note 3, at 377. Cf. John Kostyack, supra note 282, at 764 (“To
ensure adequate funding for corrective action, the Administration should ensure that
responsibility is properly divided between private and public sources.”).
324
See YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 103, at 5-10 (71% of survey respondents said that
the applicant was the primary catalyst of the HCP effort).
325
See id. at 5-3 (“Applicants were moderately or actively involved in 91% of
HCPs…before the NEPA comment period, 83% during the comment period, and 85% after
HCP approval.”)
326
Cf. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Effects of Wetlands Mitigation Banking on
People, 28 NATIONAL WETLANDS NEWSLETTER 1(2006) (finding wetlands mitigation
322

DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE, QUOTE OR REPRODUCE

14-Aug-06]

MAKING REGULATION EVOLVE

59

Congress must nonetheless examine ways to encourage applicants to assist
in making the HCP program evolve.
Even if the Services’ aim to induce applicant involvement in the HCP
program is understandable, the program must balance the No Surprises
incentives with sufficient incentives to developers to reduce uncertainty,
increase participation, and perform monitoring and adaptive management.
Such incentives could include direct federal grants or tax credits to
permittees who engage in adaptive management that provides valuable
information for future conservation activities.327 In conjunction with more
rigorous HCP monitoring, penalties could be levied on permittees for noncompliance and serve to fund the incentive program.328 Alternatively,
Congress could develop a credit program that allows a permittee to reduce
their costs for mitigation in exchange for generating and disseminating
reliable data that benefits regional or national conservation efforts.329 The
HCP program could also offer applicants a streamlined administrative
review process and more deferential judicial review if the HCP process
adopted in-depth participatory protocols.330
For larger HCPs, the Services could also alter the current disincentives
for permittees to engage in information generation and adaptive
management activities by requiring applicants to supply a bond in an
amount that compensates for the worst-case risk scenario given the
uncertainty that exists at the time the HCP is adopted.331 Only rarely have
HCPs required permittees to furnish a performance bond or other funding

banking program emphasis on permittee incentives led to larger scale distributive effects).
327
See Thomas, supra note 33, at 125; Wilhere, supra note 32, at 27 (“More and better
adaptive management would be encouraged by compensating permittees for the reliable
information they produce … that benefits the conservation of a species.”).
328
See Endangered Species Act: Incentives to Encourage Conservation by Private
Landowners: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment and Natural Resources of the
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103rd Cong. 81 (1993) (statement of Larry
McKinney, Director of Resource Protection, Texas Parks and Wildlife Department)
(describing un-adopted proposal for a “federal tax penalty, or severance tax, … levied on
lands converted to uses not compatible with the support of endangered, threatened and
candidate species, or significant biodiversity habitat.… Moneys from the tax penalty would
help fund the various incentive programs.”).
329
See Wilhere, supra note 32, at 27 (“Mitigation credits allow a permittee to do less
habitat conservation in exchange for reliable information that benefits conservation efforts
across a region. … The credits could be awarded as information is produced or as steps in
its production are completed.”).
330
See Part V.A., supra.
331
See Wilhere, supra note 32, at 27.
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source for unanticipated implementation costs.332 Key to such an
instrument would be the fact that portions of the bond would be reimbursed
to the permittee whenever she demonstrated that the worst-case damages
were less than had been conservatively anticipated when the HCP was
adopted.333 Such a bond would thus provide the applicant—the participant
with the most direct control over information gathering—a direct financial
incentive to collect and supply information and thus reduce uncertainty by
engaging in adaptive management protocols.
The incentives provided to permittees certainly do not have to be an allor-nothing proposition. The Services can also induce participation,
adaptation or information gathering by providing incentives on a sliding
scale based on the quality of the information generated or conservation
value provided in an HCP. For example, the Services can stimulate species
recovery efforts by correlating the regulatory assurances granted to
applicants with the extent of the biological benefit conferred by the HCP.334
An HCP could be structured to provide either a more substantial or longerterm guarantee of non-liability to a permittee the more that an HCP induces
the recovery of a listed species. Similarly, the more an HCP is based on
reliable data and analyses, the more extensive the regulatory assurances that
could be provided to an applicant.335 By calibrating the regulatory
assurances provided to applicants to the information and conservation value
of the HCP, regulators can more directly foster the adaptation in regulatory
processes that thus far has proved elusive in the HCP experiment.
CONCLUSION
Through their interpretation and implementation of the HCP program,
the Services’ have resolved to neglect adaptively managing the regulatory
process. Rather than promoting the diffusion of information, transparency,
participation, and adaptation of regulatory decisions, the Services have
allowed the HCP program to serve as an avenue for fragmented, long-term,
and inert regulatory decisions that rely on inadequate information and little
332

See DEFENDERS HCP DATABASE, supra note 119, at Question 46 (finding in fewer
than ten percent of 274 HCPs studied did the permittee post a performance bond or other
funding source to pay for unanticipated additional costs).
333
See Wilhere, supra note 32, at 27 (“Ultimately, the entire bond could be returned
with interest when it is demonstrated that an HCP will not result in any unacceptable
damages. Such a demonstration would depend on a satisfactory reduction in uncertainty,
which might be obtained only through adaptive management.”).
334
See NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, supra note 94, at 117.
335
See id. Conversely, HCPs should require more extensive mitigation when there are
significant information gaps about a species’ condition or the proposed take’s effect.
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stakeholder participation. They have resisted taking on a role of facilitator
and eschewed even a minimum framework for regulatory learning.
The HCP program serves as a valuable lesson that sufficient resources,
clear legislative directives, and institutional incentives for applicants and
agencies alike must be provided for adaptive regulation to have a chance.
Undoubtedly, multilateral agreement-based processes that develop up-todate scientific information and actively utilize adaptive management are
expensive and difficult to implement. The success of such processes in
furthering environmental conservation and participatory democracy,
balanced with sustainable development, largely depends on sufficient
resources, a rigorous adherence to a participatory, evolutionary approach to
regulation, and providing incentives to institutional actors to assist in the
governance process. Yet the rapid proliferation of HCPs and increased
reliance on HCP processes in the administration of the ESA—transforming
this pilot program into the regulatory norm for ESA permitting—has not
been reinforced with sufficient funding and attention to foster meaningful
participation, oversight and adaptation in this pioneering regulatory process.
By using the HCP program as a way to authorize development with little
oversight or adaptation of plans during implementation, the HCP program
has facilitated the further degradation of wildlife conservation through a
process that plays down opportunities for participation and deliberation.
Unsurprisingly, the primary beneficiary of this lack of public participation,
enforcement and adaptation are developer-applicants.
As with all regulation, ultimately the environmental, economic and
democratic benefits of a fully collaborative and adaptive HCP process may
not outweigh the administrative costs, or may do so for only certain types of
HCP decisions. Perhaps there are certain participation and adaptive
regulation tools that would provide the most cost effective method for
fostering quality HCPs in a particular context. However, because Congress
and the Services have never attempted to adaptively manage the regulatory
process, the HCP program serves as an important illustration of the
prevalent failure of administrative processes to unlock the latent but
abundant information that would begin to answer the ultimately
fundamental questions of regulatory programs: is the program working, and
how can it be improved? In order to really examine the success of a
regulatory program, the Services—indeed any regulatory agency—must be
provided the incentives to engage in systematic experimentation in the
design of the regulatory program. By incorporating adaptive management
into the regulatory process itself, regulatory agencies like the Services
charged with administering complex, unproven laws can finally begin to
help make regulation evolve.
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